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INTERFERENCES WITH SURFACE WATERS
By STANLEY V. KINYON* AND ROBERT C. McCLUREt

A

LTHOUGH

there are few reported cases on the subject prior to

1850, the draining and disposing of casual surface waters'
has been a constantly increasing source of litigation between neighboring possessors of land during the last ninety years. Whenever
a tract of land is graded, cultivated, or otherwise improved, a
swamp drained, a structure erected, or a highway or railroad constructed, the flow of surface waters is likely to be altered, with
resulting harm to some possessor of nearby land. In so far as
fundamental principles are concerned, there would seem to be
little or no difference between such cases and the cases in which
harm is caused to a possessor of land through interferences with
watercourses, lakes, or subterranean waters or through the media
of fumes, noises, or vibrations. In each instance, one possessor of
land sustains harm in the use and enjoyment of his land as a
result, usually, of another's use and enjoyment of other land. The
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
tAssociated with the firm of Doherty, Rumble, Butler, Sullivan &
Mitchell, St. Paul, Minn.
iBy "casual surface waters" is meant those occasional recurrent accumulations of excess water from rains and melting snows which either stand in
temporary ponds and puddles or drain off across the countryside until they
reach a drainway, stream or lake, or are absorbed in the soil. See Restatement of Torts, Vol. IV, sec. 846. This, of course, is not and does not purport to be a precise legal definition of the lines of demarcation between
casual surface waters on the one hand and watercourses, lakes and subterranean waters on the other. It is merely a general description of one form
that water may take and in which it may give rise to legal controversies.
The typical surface water cases are easily distinguishable from the typical
cases involving streams, lakes and underground waters, and it is with such
typical situations that this article is concerned. A precise distinction between
the various forms of water is necessary only in the borderline cases, and it
is at least arguable that such cases are sui generis and should not be decided
by a definitive process of forcing them into a class where they do not clearly
belong in order to apply to them rules that are not clearly appropriate.
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problem is one of reconciling conflicting uses of land, and the
important question is whether circumstances exist which will
justify a court in shifting the loss, or a part of it, from the person
harmed to the person causing it.
Few courts, however, seem tc have recognized this fact, and
only in New Hampshire and possibly Minnesota have all invasions of a possessor's interests in the use and enjoyment of his
land been treated as different phases of a single problem involving
the application of the same fundamental principles, irrespective of
the medium through which the invasions are caused. 2 The general
practice has been to make different categories according to the
medium through which the harm is caused; to regard invasions
through interference with the flow of surface waters as quite different from invasions of the same interests through other media,
and to adopt somewhat different principles of law in each category.
Consequently, in most jurisdictions there is a separate and distinct
2In New Hampshire the reasonable use doctrine is followed and applied
as the basic principle of liability in cases in which an invasion of interests in
the use and enjoyment of land results from interferences with the flow of
surface waters, see infra, footnote 88; from interferences with subterranean
waters, as in Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., (1862) 43 N. H. 569, 82 Am.
Dec. 170 (where defendant obstructed the drainage of subterranean percolating water from plaintiff's land), and from interferences with watercourses,
as in Hayes v. Waldron, (1863) 44 N. H. 580, 84 Am. Dec. 105; Green v.
Gilbert, (1880) 60 N. H. 144 (where sawdust was discharged into a watercourse) ; Concord Mfg. Co. v. Robertson, (1889) 66 N. H. 1, 25 Atl. 718,
18 L. R. A. 679; Gillis v. Chase, (1891) 67 N. H. 161, 31 At. 18, 68 Am.
St. Rep. 645 (diversion of water from watercourse). The doctrine is also
applied in other cases of private nuisance, where the invasion of interests in
the use and enjoyment of land is caused through other media: Davis v.
Whitney, (1894) 68 N. H. 66, 44 At. 78 (invasion by lint, dust, and smoke) ;

Ladd v. Granite State Brick Co., (1894) 68 N. H. 185, 37 Atl. 1041 (invasion

by smoke) ; Faucher v. Trudel, (1902) 71 N. H. 621, 52 At. 443 (invasion
by noise from blacksmith shop).
In Minnesota, as in New Hampshire, the reasonable use doctrine is
applied as the basic principle of liability in cases where an invasion of
interests in the use and enjoyment of land results from interferences with
the flow of surface waters, see infra, footnotes 101-102; from interferences
with subterranean waters, Erickson v. Crookston Waterworks Power &
Light Co., (1907) 100 Minn. 481, 111 N. W. 391, 9 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1250,
10 Ann. Cas. 843, (1908) 105 Minn. 182, 117 N. W. 435, 17 L. R. A. (N.S.)
650 (appropriation of subterranean water hindered plaintiff's use of artesian
wells) ; and from interferences with watercourses, Red River Roller Mills v.
Wright, (1883) 30 Minn. 249, 15 N. XV. 167, 44 Am. Rep. 194; Pinney v.
Luce, (1890) 44 Minn. 367, 46 N. W. 561; Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v.
St. Anthony Falls Water-Power Co., (1901) 82 Minn. 505, 85 N. W. 520.
Although there is some doubt, it is probable that the reasonable use doctrine
is also applied in other cases of private nuisance where the invasion is caused
through other media; Romer v. St. Faul City Ry., (1899) 75 Minn. 211,
77 N. W. 825, 74 Am. St. Rep. 455 (invasion by noise from operation of
street cars) ; cf. Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., (1919) 143 Minn.
374, 173 N. W. 805, 6 A. L. R. 1092 (invasion by dust from operation of
quarry and rock crusher).

INTERFERENCES WITH SURFACE WATERS

"law of surface waters" which in many respects differs markedly
from the law applicable in the same jurisdictions to watercourses,
subterranean waters, and private nuisances in general.3 Even with
this segregation and isolation of the law governing interferences
with the flow of surface waters, however, there is little uniformity
in the principles of law adopted by the several jurisdictions in the
United States with respect to such invasions. Three principal and
widely divergent views have been developed-the so-called civil
law rule, common enemy rule, and reasonable use rule-and it will
be the first object of this article to discuss these three rules in
some detail, and point out, so far as possible, the actual results
produced by each.
I. THE EXISTING LAW ON THE SUBJECT
A. THE CIVIL LAW RULE

In substance, the civil law rule of surface waters is that a person who interferes with the natural flow of surface waters so as to
cause an invasion of another's interests in the use and enjoyment
of his land is subject to liability to the other.4 Each parcel of land
,,In New York, for example, the common law or common enemy rule
of surface waters is followed. See infra, footnote 71. But the reasonable
use doctrine is followed in the law of watercourses, Prentice v. Geiger,
(1878) 74 N. Y. 341; Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., (1900) 164 N. Y. 303,
5 , N. E. 142, 51 L. R. A. 6S7, 79 Am. St. Rep. 643, re-argument denied,
(1900) 165 N. Y. 617, 59 N. E. 1131; but cf. Whalen v. Union Bag &
Paper Co., (1913) 208 N. Y. 1, 101 N. E. 805; the law of subterranean
waters, Hathorn v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., (1909) 194 N. Y. 326, 87
N. E. 504, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 436, 128 Am. St. Rep. 555, 16 Ann. Cas. 989;
People v. New York Carbonic Acid Gas Co., (1909) 196 N. Y. 421, 90
N. E. 441; but cf. Dunbar v. Sweeney, (1921) 230 N. Y. 609, 130 N. E.
913, and the law governing private nuisances in general, Campbell v. Seaman,

(1876) 63 N. Y. 568, 20 Am. Rep. 567; Booth v. Rome, W. & 0. T. R. R.,
(1893) 140 N. Y. 267, 35 N. E. 592, 24 L. R. A. 105, 37 Am. St. Rep. 552;

McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., (1907) 189 N. Y. 40, 81 N. E. 549,
13 L. R. A. (N.S.) 465, 12 Ann. Cas. 840; see Cogswell v. New York,
N. H. & H. R. R., (1886) 103 N. Y. 10, 13-14, 8 N. E. 537, 57 Am. Rep. 701.
Likewise, in Massachusetts the common law or common enemy rule of
surface waters is followed. See infra, footnote 64. The reasonable use doctrine, however, is followed in the law of watercourses, see Stratton v. Mount
Hermon Boys' School, (1913) 216 Mass. 83, 84-89, 103 N. E. 87, 49 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 57, Ann. Cas. 1915A 768, and in the law governing private nuisances
in general, Rogers v. Elliott, (1888) 146 Mass. 349, 15 N. E. 768, 4 Am. St.
Rep. 316; Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., (1914) 216 Mass. 486, 104 N. E.
371, Ann. Cas. 1915B 1054; Tortorella v. H. Traiser Co., (1933) 284 Mass.
497, 188 N. E. 254, 90 A. L. R. 1203. But there seems to be an unlimited
privilege to interfere with the flow of subterranean percolating waters.
Greenleaf v. Francis, (1836) 18' Pick. (Mass.) 117; see Walker v. Cronin,
(1871) 107 Mass. 555, 564; Davis v. Spaulding, (1892) 157 Mass. 431, 434,
32 N. E. 650, 19 L. R. A. 102.
4No quotation from text book, law review, or case has been found which
expresses the civil law rule in precisely the language used above. Yet, from
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is said to be subject to a natural servitude for the natural flow of
surface water across it,- and therefore a possessor of lower land
is not privileged to obstruct the natural flow of surface water from
higher land," nor is a possessor of higher land privileged to increase the natural flow of surface water upon lower land.7
The courts of the jurisdictions in which the civil law rule was
originally adopted appear to have derived it directly from the civil
codes of foreign nations" and to have justified their adoption of it
upon a principle of natural law expressed in the maxim aqua currit
an exhaustive study of cases and other materials, it is the opinion of the
writers that this statement accurately expresses the fundamental proposition
embodied in the rule. Almost universally the rule is stated in more specific
terms. For .example, in Martin v. Riddle, (1848) 26 Pa. St. 415, 416, it
was said, "Where two fields adjoin, and one is lower than the other, the
lower must necessarily be subject to all the natural flow of water from the
upper one. The inconvenience arises from its position, and is usually more
than compensated by other circumstances. Hence the owner of the lower
ground has no right to erect embankments whereby the natural flow of water
from the upper ground shall be stopped; nor has the owner of the upper
ground a right to make any excavations or drains by which the flow of
water is directed from its natural channel, and a new channel made on the
lower ground; nor can he collect into cne channel waters usually flowing off
into his neighbor's fields by several channels, and thus increase the wash
upon the lower fields."
5
"The doctrine of the civil law is, that the owner of the upper or dominant estate has a natural easement or servitude in the lower or servient one,
to discharge all waters falling or accumulating upon his land, which is
higher, upon or over the land of the servient owner, as in a state of
nature.

. . ."

Nininger v. Norwood, (1882)

72 Ala. 277, 282-283, 47 Am.

Rep. 412. A substantially similar statement may be found in innumerable
cases; see for example: Gray v. McWilliams, (1893) 98 Cal. 157, 161-162,
32 Pac. 976, 21 L. R. A. 593, 35 Am. St. Rep. 163, and Dugan v. Long,
(1930) 234 Ky. 511, 514, 28 S. W. (2d) 765. See also Louisiana Civil Code
(1870) Art. 660.
6
Gray v. McWilliams, (1893) 98 Cal. 157, 32 Pac. 976, 21 L. R. A.
593, 35 Am. St. Rep. 163; Farkas v. Towns, (1897) 103 Ga. 150, 29 S. E.
700, 68 Am. St. Rep. 88; Garland v. Aurin, (1899) 103 Tenn. 555, 53 S. W.
940, 48 L. R. A. 862, 76 Am. St. Rep. 699; Louisiana Civil Code (1870)
Art. 660.
7Heier v. Krull, (1911) 160 Cal. 441, 117 Pac. 530; Boynton v. Longley,
(1885) 19 Nev. 69, 6 Pac. 437, 3 Am. St. Rep. 781; Louisiana Civil Code
(1870) Art. 660. In most civil law rule jurisdictions this phase of the rule
has been modified to a very great extent. See infra, footnotes 145-160
and text.
sIn Martin v. Riddle, (1848) 26 Pa. St. 415, 416, it was said of the law
of surface waters: "Not readily finding the subject treated of in any of our
usual books of reference, I venture to extract the law from books of foreign
origin-Corp. Jur. Civ. 39, 3, 1, and 43, 21; Code Nap. sec. 640; Poth du
Voisinage." The Civil Code of Louisiana, although a composite of French
and Spanish law, is based primarily upon the Code Napoleon. Tucker,
Source Books of Louisiana Law (1935) 1-7, 36-45; Saunders, Revised Civil
Code of Louisiana (2d ed. 1933) iii-ix, xvii-xxx. The language. of the
Louisiana Civil Code dealing with surface waters, (1870) Art. 660, is practically identical with the language used in the civil codes of foreign nations.
See French Civil Code (1804) Art. 640; Italian Civil Code (1865) Art. 536.
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ct debet currere.3 The real reason for the rule, however, would
seem to be found in the idea that the least harmful and therefore
the best way to dispose of surface waters is to require the maintenance of natural drainage rather than to permit each possessor to
deal with the surface water problem as he pleases and without
regard to the welfare of his neighbors.' 0
The courts of Louisiana were the first to adopt the civil law
rule in this country, applying it as early as 1812.11 The first
American jurisdiction outside of Louisiana to adopt the rule was
Pennsylvania, applying it in the case of Martin v. Riddle." Shortly
thereafter it was adopted in other jurisdictions. 13 In none of these
earlier cases, however, was reference made to the common enemy
rule, which was being developed by other courts at approximately
the same time. 4 In the more recent cases in which the civil law
rule has been adopted, however, the courts have expressly recognized the common enemy rule and elected to adopt the civil law
rule in preference to it. 15
'Almost the whole law of watercourses is founded on the maxim of the
common law, aqua currit et debet currere. Because water is descendible by
nature, the owner of a dominant or superior heritage has an easement in the
servient or inferior tenement for the discharge of all waters which by nature
rise in or flow or fall upon the superior." Kauffman v. Griesemer, (1856)
26 Pa. St. 407, 413, 67 Am. Dec. 437.
""'As water must flow, and some rule in regard to it must be established
where land is held under the artificial titles created by human law, there can
clearly be no other rule at once so equitable and so easy of application as that
which enforces natural laws. There is no surprise or hardship in this, for
each successive owner takes with whatever advantages or inconveniences
nature has stamped upon his land." Gormley v. Sanford, (1869) 52 Ill.
158, 162.
"Orleans Navigation Co. v. New Orleans, (1812) 2 Martin (O.S.)
214. For subsequent cases, see Lattimore v. Davis, (1839) 14 La. 161, 33
Am. Dec. 120; Martin v. Jett, (1838) 12 La. 501, 32 Am. Dec. 120.
1-'(1848) 26 Pa. St. 415. This case, although decided in 1848, was not
reported until 1852.
'-Overton v. Sawyer, (1854) 46 N. C. 308, 62 Am. Dec. 170; Butler v.
Peck, (1865) 16 Ohio St. 334, 88 Am. Dec. 452. During this period several
cases were decided in jurisdictions which subsequently adopted the common
enemy rule of surface waters, in which the courts indicated their approval of
the civil law rule. See Bellows v. Sackett, (1853) 15 Barb. (N.Y.) 96,
Laumier v. Francis, (1856) 23 Mo. 181, 184.
101-102;
4
See infra, footnotes 52-54. Furthermore, in these early cases the courts
were not aware of the reasonable use doctrine, which had not yet been applied
to cases involving interference with the flow of surface waters. But in
Butler v. Peck (1865) 16 Ohio St. 334, 88 Am. Dec. 452, a case in which
the court applied the civil law rule to facts involving an alteration in the
natural flow of surface water, counsel's brief contained a citation of the case
of Bassett v. Salisbury Manufacturing Co., (1862) 43 N. H. 569, 82 Am.
Dec. 170, where the reasonable use doctrine was applied to interferences
with the flow of subterranean waters. The court in the Butler Case, however, apparently did not recognize the possibility of applying the reasonable
use doctrine to cases of alterations in the natural flow of surface waters.
"'See Ogburn v. Connor, (1873) 46 Cal. 346, 351-352, 13 Am. Rep. 213;
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At the present time the courts of the following jurisdictions,
with a good many modifications and qualifications which will be
discussed below, purport to follow the civil law rule: Alabama,'
California,1 7 Colorado,' 8 Georgia, 19 Illinois, -o, Iowa," Kansas, ="
Albany v. Sikes, (1894) 94 Ga. 30, 32-35, 20 S. E. 257, 26 L. R. A. 653,

47 Am. St. Rep. 132; Boyd v. Conklin, (1884) 54 Mich. 583, 587-593, 20
N. W.
595, 52 Am. Rep. 831.
' 6 Nininger v. Norwood, (1882) 72 Ala. 277, 47 Am. Rep. 412; Crabtree v. Baker, (1883) 75 Ala. 91, 51 Am. Rep. 424; Savannah, A. & 11. Ry.
v. Buford, (1894) 106 Ala. 303, 17 So. 395; Southern Ry. v. Lewis, (1910)
165 Ala. 555, 51 So. 746; Tennessee, A. & G. Ry. v. Cardon, (1937) 27 Ala.
App. 585, 177 So. 171. See generally Cocke, Rights and Liabilities of Coterminous Landowners With Respect to Obstruction and Diversion of Surface
Water,
(1926) 1 Ala. L. J. 117. See also infra, footnotes 147 and 187.
' 7Ogburn v. Connor, (1873) 46 Cal. 346, 13 Am. Rep. 213; Gray v.
McWilliams, (1893) 98 Cal. 157, 32 Pac. 976, 21 L. R. A. 593, 35 Am. St.
Rep. 163; Le Brun v. Richards, (19.30) 210 Cal. 308, 291 Pac. 825, 72
A. L. R. 336. See generally Note, (1920) 8 Cal. L. Rev. 197. See also
infra, footnotes 148 and 188.
'5 See City of Boulder v. Boulder 8: White Rock Ditch & Reservoir Co.,
(1923) 73 Colo. 426, 428, 216 Pac. 553, 36 A. L. R. 1458; Debevitz v. New
Brantner Extension Ditch Co., (1925) 78 Colo. 396, 398, 241 Pac. 1111.
See also
infra, footnote 149.
' 9 Farkas v. Towns, (1897) 103 Ga.. 150, 29 S. E. 700, 68 Am. St. Rep.
88; Hendrix v. McEachern, (1927) 164 Ga. 457, 139 S. E. 9; see Albany v.
Sikes, (1894) 94 Ga. 30, 32-35, 20 S. E. 257, 26 L. R. A. 653, 47 Am. St.
Rep. 132. See also infra, footnote 191.
20 Dayton v. Drainage Commissioners, (1889) 128 Ill. 271, 21 N. E. 198;
Chicago, P. & St. L. Ry. v. Reuter, (1905) 223 Ill. 287, 79 N. E. 166; Beechley
v. Harms, (1928) 332 Ill. 185, 163 N. E. 387; see Gormley v. Sanford,
(1869) 52 Ill. 158, 162. See generally (1918) 13 Ill. L. Rev. 63; (1920)
15 Ill. L. Rev. 282; (1921) 15 Ill. L. Rev. 462; (1923) 17 Ill. L. Rev. 454.
See also
infra, footnote 150.
2
'In early Iowa cases dealing with surface water, the court rejected
both the civil law rule and the common enemy rule. An intermediate rule
was adopted which was to the effect that a possessor of land is subject to
liability for unnecessarily causing harm to others. Livingston v. McDonald,
(1866) 21 Iowa 160, 89 Am. Dec. 563; Willitts v. Chicago, B. & K. C. Ry.,
(1893) 88 Iowa 281, 85 N. W. 313, 21 L. R. A. 608. However, in a subsequent case the court misconstrued the Livingston Case and said that the
civil law rule had been adopted in that case. Baker v. Akron, (1909) 145
Iowa 485, 487-489, 122 N. W. 926, 30 L. R. A. (N.S.) 619. As a result of
this misconstruction, the Iowa Court at the present time follows the civil
law rule. Herman v. Drew, (1933) 216 Iowa 315, 249 N. XV. 277; see
Young v. Scott, (1933) 216 Iowa 1253, 1254, 250 N. W. 484; Clark v.
Pierce, (Iowa 1938) 277 N. W. 711. See generally (1929) 14 Iowa L. Rev.
547. See also infra, footnotes 113 and 151.
22
1n early Kansas cases the court adopted and applied the common
enemy rule, Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Hammer, (1879) 22 Kan. 763,
31 Am. Rep. 216; see Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Keys, (1895) 55 Kan. 205,
217-218, 40 Pac. 275, 49 Am. St. Rep. 249, subject to the exception that a
possessor of lower land is subject to liability for harm caused by the obstruction of a natural drainway for the flow of surface water. Palmer v. Vaddell,
(1879) 22 Kan. 352. This exception to the common enemy rule is discussed
below at footnotes 165-177 and text. However, in 1911 a statute was enacted
which in effect adopted the civil law rule with respect to agricultural lands
and to highways in rural districts. Kansas, Laws 1911, ch. 175, sec. 1. This
statute was amended in 1917, Kansas, Laws 1917, ch. 176, sec. 1, and again
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Kentucky,2 3 Louisiana, 24 Maryland, 25 Michigan, 2 Nevada2 7 North
Carolina, 2 Ohio,!" Pennsylvania, 0 South Dakota, 31 Tennessee, 32
and Texas. 3
in 1931. Kansas, Laws 1931, ch. 184, sec. 1. As thus amended the statute
may be found in Kansas, General Statutes 1935, ch. 24, sec. 105. Consequently, at the present time the civil law rule is in force in Kansas with
respect to agricultural lands. Martin v. Lown, (1922) 111 Kans. 752, 208
Pac. 565; Skinner v. Wolf, (1928) 126 Kan. 158, 266 Pac. 926; see Dyer v.
Stahlhut, (1938) 147 Kan. 767, 770, 78 P. (2d) 900. See infra, footnotes
152 and 190.
-3johnson v. Marcum, (1913) 152 Ky. 629, 153 S. W. 959; see Pickerill
v. Louisville, (1907) 125 Ky. 213, 225-226, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 1239, 100 S. W.
873; Dugan v. Long, (1930) 234 Ky. 511, 514, 28 S. W. (2d) 765; Board
of Trustees of Town of Auburn v. Chyle, (1934) 256 Ky. 283, 286, 75 S. W.
(2d) 1039. See infra, footnotes 153 and 192.
2Orleans Navigation Co. v. New Orleans, (1812) 2 Martin (O.S.)
(La.) 214; Martin v. Jett, (1838) 12 La. 501, 32 Am. Dec. 120; Lattimore
v. Davis, (1839) 14 La. 161, 33 Am. Dec. 581; Delahoussaye v. Judice,
(1858) 13 La. Ann. 587, 71 Am. Dec. 521; Hooper v. Wilkinson, (1860)
15 La. Ann. 497, 77 Am. Dec. 194; Barrow v. Landry, (1850) 15 La.
Ann. 681, 77 Am. Dec. 199; Bolinger v. Murray, (1931) 18 La. App.
158, 137 So. 761. See Louisiana Civil Code (1870) Art. 660. See also
infra,2 footnote 154.
Philadelphia, W. & B. R. R. v. Davis, (1888) 68 Md. 281, 11 Ati.
822, 6 Am. St. Rep. 440; Baltimore & S. P. R. R. v. Hackett, (1898)
87 Md.
20 224, 39 Atl. 510.
Boyd v. Conklin, (1884) 54 Mich. 583, 20 N. W. 595, 52 Am. Rep.
831; Gregory v. Bush, (1887) 64 Mich. 37, 31 N. W. 90, 8 Am. St.
Rep. 797; see Leidlein v. Meyer, (1893) 95 Mich. 586, 589-590, 55 N. W.
367; Crane v. Valley Land Co., (1918) 203 Mich. 353, 359, 169 N. W. 18.
infra, footnote 155.
See also
-7 Boynton v. Longley, (1885) 19 Nev. 69, 6 Pac. 437, 3 Am. St. Rep.
781.
-8Overton v. Sawyer, (1854) 46 N. C. 308, 62 Am. Dec. 170; Porter v.
Durham, (1876) 74 N. C. 767; Winchester v. Byers, (1928) 196 N. C.
383, 2145 S. E. 774. See also infra, footnote 156.
Butler v. Peck, (1865) 16 Ohio St. 334, 88 Am. Dec. 452; Blue v.
Wentz, (1896) 54 Ohio St. 247, 43 N. E. 493; Henicle v. Pennsylvania
R. R., (1934) 49 Ohio App. 447, 197 N. E. 360. See also infra, footnotes3 157 and 194.
OIn one of the earliest cases dealing with surface waters decided in
Pennsylvania the civil law rule was not applied. Bentz v. Armstrong,
(1844) 8 Watts & S. (Pa.) 40, 42 Am. Dec. 265. This case has since
been cited for the proposition that an exception to the civil law rule exists
in favor of urban land. Gould, Law of Waters (3d ed. 1900) sec. 268,
p. 542. That so-called exception to the civil law rule is discussed below
at footnotes 187-194 and text. Since that time, however, it has become
settled in Pennsylvarfia that the civil law rule is in force with respect to
rural land. Martin v. Riddle, (1848) 26 Pa. St. 415; Kauffman v.
Griesemer, (1856) 26 Pa. St. 407, 67 Am. Dec. 437. See also infra,
158 and 189.
footnotes
21
See Thompson v. Andrews, (1917) 39 S. D. 477, 485-486, 165 N. W.
9. See
also infra, footnotes 114, 116-117, and 159.
32 Garland v. Aurin, (1899) 103 Tenn. 555, 53 S. W. 940, 48 L. R. A.

862, 76 Am. St. Rep. 699; Davis v. Louisville & N. R. R., (1921)
Tenn.33 1, 244 S. W. 483. See infra, footnote 193.

147

In early cases the Texas court applied the common enemy rule of

surface waters.

Barnett v. Matagorda Rice & Irrigation Co., (1904) 98

Tex. 355, 83 S. W. 801, 107 Am. St. Rep. 636.

However, in 1915 a
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B. THE CommoN ENEMY RULE
The "common enemy" or, as it is sometimes called, the "common law" rule of surface waters is, in substance, that a possessor
of land has an unlimited and unrestricted legal privilege to deal
with the surface water on his land as he pleases, regardless of the
harm which he may thereby cause to others.3"
Some courts have justified this rule upon a narrow and onesided conception of the nature of land ownership. 35 Others have
predicated their adoption of it upon the ground that it is consistent
statute was enacted which in effect adopted the civil law rule of surface
waters. Texas, General Laws, First Called Session, 1915, ch. 7, sec. 1.
This statute has been carried over into Vernon's Texas Statutes 1936, Art.
7589a. Consequently, at the present time the civil law rule of surface waters
is in force in Texas. Miller v. Letzerich, (1932) 121 Tex. 248, 49 S. W.
(2d) 404; 85 A. L. R. 451; Roby v. Hawthorne, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934)
77 S. W. (2d) 923; Calhoun v. Baize, (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) 114 S. W.
(2d) 634. See infra, footnotes 118 and 160.
34
Perhaps the earliest clear expression of the common enemy rule is
that in Gannon v. Hargadon, (1865) 10 Allen (Mass.) 106, 109-110, 87
Am. Dec. 625, where Chief Justice Bigelow said, "The right of an owner of
land to occupy and improve it in such manner and for such purposes as he
may see fit, either by changing the surface or the erection of buildings or
other structures thereon, is not restricted or modified by the fact that his
own land is so situated with reference to that of adjoining owners that an
alteration in the mode of its improverrent or occupation in any part of it
will cause water, which may accumulate thereon by rains and snows falling
on its surface or flowing on to it over the surface of adjacent lots, either
to stand in unusual quantities on other adjacent lands, or pass into and
over the same in greater quantities or in other directions than they were
accustomed to flow. . . . [W]here there is no watercourse by grant or
prescription, and no stipulation exists between coterminous proprietors
of land concerning the mode in which their respective parcels shall be
occupied and improved, no right to regulate or control the surface drainage of water can be asserted by the owner of one lot over that of his
neighbor. Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum is a general rule,
applicable to the use and enjoyment of real property, and the right of a
party to. the free and unfettered control of his own land above, upon and.
beneath the surface cannot be interfered with or restrained by any considerations of injury to others which may be occasioned by the flow of
mere surface water in consequence of the lawful appropriation of land by
its owner to a particular use or mode of enjoyment. Nor it is at all
material, in the application of this principle of law, whether a party obstructs or changes the direction and flow of surface water by preventing
it from coming within the limits of his land, or by erecting barriers or
changing the level of the soil, so as to turn it off in a new course after
it has come within his boundaries. The obstruction of surface water or
an alteration in the flow of it affords no cause of action in behalf of a
person who may suffer loss or detriment therefrom against one who does
not act inconsistent with the due exercise of dominion over his own soil."
35
In Grant v. Allen, (1874) 41 Conn. 156, 160, it was said, "The right
of the owner of land to determine the manner in which he will use it, or the
mode in which he will enjoy it, the same being lawful, is too high in character to be affected by considerations growing out of the retention, diversion,
or repulsion of mere surface water ... ." See also Goodale v. Tuttle, (1864)
29 N. Y. 459, 467.
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with the public policy favoring land improvement and development.36 Still others have adopted the rule because, in their opinion,
37
it represents the English "common law."1

In recent years, some legal writers have questioned the conclusion that the "common enemy" rule is the rule of the English
common law.38 These writers assert that the rule is not supported
by English authority," and have therefore concluded that calling
the "common enemy" rule the "common law" rule is misleading
and erroneous. A few of these writers have gone even further
and taken the position that the English authorities really support
the civil law rule.40 Consequently, it seems desirable to advert
briefly to the English cases.
Prior to 1850 the English reports are rather barren of intelligible cases dealing with the law of surface waters.4 This may be
due to the early establishment of administrative procedures which
probably absorbed most of the controversies over land drainage.42
36"Society has an interest in the cultivation and improvement of lands,
and in the reclamation of waste lands. It is also for the public interest that
improvements shall be made, and that towns and cities shall be built. To
adopt the principle that the law of nature must be observed in respect to
surface drainage, would, we think, place undue restriction upon industry,
and enterprise, and the control by an owner of his property." Andrews, J.
in Barkley v. Wilcox, (1887) 86 N. Y. 140, 148, 40 Am. Rep. 519.
Similar language was used by Chief Justice Beasley in Bowlsby v.
Speer, (1865) 31 N. J. L. 351, 352-353, 86 Am. Dec. 216.
37Edwards v. Charlotte, C. & A. R. R., (1893) 39 S. C. 472, 474-475,
18 S.E. 58, 22 L. R. A. 246, 39 Am. St. Rep. 746; Abbott v. Kansas City,
St. J. & C. B. Ry., (1884) 83 Mo. 271, 53 Am. Rep. 581.
383 Farnham, Law of Waters and Water Rights (1904) sec. 889b, pp.
2587-2591; Thomson, Surface Waters, (1889) 23 Am. L. Rev. 372, 387-391;
Rood, Surface Water in Cities, (1908) 6 Mich. L. Rev. 448, 451-453; Note,
(1935) 15 Bos. U. L. Rev. 892, 895-896.
39OSee in addition to the material in footnote 38: Note, (1920) 8 Cal. L.
Rev. 197, 198; Note, (1918) 3 Corn. L. Q. 313, 315; Note, (1929) 15 Va. L.
Rev. 288, 290; Note (1929) 5 Wis. L. Rev. 239, 240.
•103 Farnham, Law of Waters and Water Rights (1904) sec. 889b, pp.
2587-2589; Rood, Surface Water in Cities, (1908) 6 Mich. L. Rev. 448, 451453. The cases upon which these writers mainly rely are cited infra,
footnote 41.
4'The following early English cases are the only ones which have been
found dealing with the law of surface waters: Anonymous, (1344) Y. B.
18 Edw. III., p. 22, pl. 1; Anonymous, (1468) Y. B. 8 Edw. IV., p. 5, pl. 14;
Harcourt v. Spicer, (1521) Y. B. 12 Hen. VIII., p. 2, pl. 2; Ward v. Metcalfe, (1641) Clayton 96. They are the cases principally relied upon by
Farnham and Rood (footnote 40, supra) in support of their conclusion that
the English law of surface waters really is in accord with the civil law rule.
Their significance, however, is doubtful at the most.
42For early English statutes establishing administrative procedures with
respect to the drainage and reclamation of lands and the protection of them
against the ravages of the sea and floods, see: (1427) 6 Hen. VI., ch. 5;
(1429) 8 Hen. VI., ch. 3; (1439) 18 Hen. VI., ch. 10; (1444) 23 Hen. VI.,
ch. 8; (1472) 12 Edw. IV., ch. 6; (1487) 4 Hen. VII., ch. 1; (1531) 23
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Whatever the explanation, there is so little authority that no really
definitive statement can be made as to what the English common
law of surface waters was prior to that time.4 3 The cases decided
since 1850 are no more satisfactory. In 1853, and again in 1855
and 1856 the Court of Exchequer decided that a possessor of lower
land had no action against a possessor of higher land for withholding the natural flow of surface water from the lower land.44
In the last two cases the court even made statements to the effect
that an owner of land may use or dispose of surface water at his
pleasure.4 r This attitude, quite at odds with the theory of the civil
law rule, is in accord with the English view, established in Acton v.

Blundell", and Ctwsemore v. Richard,4 7 that the flow of subterranean percolatingwaters may be interrupted without liability; and
it would seem to indicate that the English courts of that day regarded all water not forming part of a watercourse, whether surface or subsurface, as something which each possessor of land was
privileged to use or fight for his own benefit regardless of the
harm thereby caused to others. However, in other cases the English courts apparently gave indirect approval to the civil law rule.4"
Hen. VIII., ch. 5; (1533) 25 Hen. VIII., ch. 10. The draining and reclaiming of land was apparently regarded as a matter of great importance and
a project to be encouraged enthusiastically: 24 Dasent, Acts of the Privy
Council of England-1598-1599 (1905) 323, 329-330, 395-396.
43Several courts in the British empire have questioned the conclusion
(arrived at by the writers mentioned above, Notes 38-40) that the early
English cases (Note 41) adopt the civil law rule of surface waters. See
Vinnicombe v. MacGregor, (1903) 29 Vict. L. Rep. 32, 49-51 ; Makowecki v.
Yachimyc. (Alberta 1917) 34 Dom. L. 'Rep. 130, 142-146; Edwards v. Scott
Rural Municipality. (Sask. 1933) [19,4] 1 W. W. Rep. 33, 40-44, aff'd,
Rural Municipality of Scott v. Edwards, [1934] S. C. Rep. 332.
44Greatrex v. Hayward, (1853) 8 Exch. 291, 22 L. J.Ex. 137; Rawstrom
v. Taylor, (1855) 11 Exch. 369, 25 L. J.Ex. 33; Broadbent v. Ramsbotham,
(1856)
11 Exch. 602, 25 L. J.Ex. 115, 4 W. R. 290.
4
5"This is the case of common surface water rising out of springy or
boggy ground, and flowing in no definite channel, although contributing to
the supply, of the plaintiff's mill. This water having no defined course, and
its supply being merely casual, the defendant is entitled to get rid of it in
any way he pleases." Rawstron v. Taylor, (1855) 11 Exch. 369, 382, 25
L. J.Ex. 33.
"No doubt, all the water falling from heaven and shed upon the surface
of a hill, at the foot of which a brook runs, must, by the natural force of
gravity, find its way to the bottom, and so into the brook; but this does not
prevent the owner of the land on which this water falls from dealing with
it as he may please and appropriating it." Broadbent v. Ramsbotham, (1856)
11 Exch. 602, 615, 25 L. J.Ex. 115, 4 W. R. 290.
46(1843) 12 M. & W. 324, 13 L. J.Ex. 289.
47(1859) 7 H. L. Cas. 349, 29 L. J. Ex. 81, 5 Jur. (N.S.) 873, 7
W. R. 685.
4
Sin Smith v. Kenrick, (1849) 7 C. B. 515, 566, 18 L. J.C. P. 172,
13 Jur. 362, it was said in dicta, "And this is in accordance with the civil
law, by which it was considered that land on a lower level, owed a natural
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Furthermore, the courts of the British Empire, outside of England, do not follow a uniform view. Some of them have adopted
the civil law rule,"5 and others the common enemy rule." Consequently, it seems impossible to determine precisely what is or has
been the British common law of surface waters; and it would
therefore seem preferable to use the term "common enemy"' 1
servitude to that on a higher, in respect of receiving, without claim to compensation, the water naturally flowing down to it." And in Scots Mines
Co. v. Leadhill Mines Co., (1859) 34 L. T. (O.S.) 34, H. L., it was said,
"It must be recollected that, without any convention, the occupier of a
lower field holds it under the servitude of receiving the natural drainage
from an adjoining field on a higher level ..
" But in the latter case the
statement quoted may have referred to the law of Scotland, which follows
the civil law rule. See footnote 49. In Whalley v. Lancashire & Yorkshire
Ry., (1884) L. R. 13 Q. B. 131, 136, 53 L. J. Q. B. 285, 50 L. T. 472, it
was said, "Then we come to the case of having property which is subject
to this defect, that unless you can prevent the injury which the ordinary
course of nature will bring upon it by transferring that injury to your neighbour's property, your property must suffer as a natural consequence of its
position. . . . If the owner of such property, in order to cure that defect,
were to do something to his land which . . . would throw that defect on
his neighbour's land, he would, I think, according to ordinary principles of
law, become liable to pay the damages this would occasion. .. "
'15The civil law rule appears to have been adopted in the Australian
state of Victoria, see Vinnicombe v. MacGregor, (1902) 29 Vict. L. Rep.
32, 33-45; also in India, Sheik Hussain Sahib v. Subbayya, (1925) I. L. R.
Madras 441, Scotland, see Campbell v. Bryson, (1864) 3 Sess. Cas. (MacPh.)
254, 259-260, 263, and in the Isle of Guernsey. Gibbons v. Lenfesty, (1915)
84 L. J. P. C. 158. Prior to the adoption of the common enemy rule for all
Canadian provinces (see footnote 50), the civil law rule was in force in
Alberta. Makowecki v. Yachimyc, (1917) 34 Dom. L. Rep. 130; Farnell v.
Parks, (1917) 38 Dom. L. Rep. 17.
z'OThe common enemy rule appears to have been adopted in New Zealand. Black & White Cabs, Ltd. v. Tonks, [1928] N. Z. L. Rep. 590. In
the case of Rural Municipality of Scott v. Edwards, [1934] S. C. Rep. 332,
the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the common enemy rule, thus making
it the governing law of surface waters for all Canadian provinces except,
possibly, Quebec. Prior to that time the courts of Manitoba, Wilton v.
Murray, (1897) 12 Man. Rep. 35; Meier v. Franklin, [1927] 2 Dom. L.
Rep. 294, Nova Scotia, Harrison v. Harrison, (1883) 16 N. S. Rep. 338,
Ontario, Williams v. Richards, (1893) 23 Ont. Rep. 651, and Saskatchewan,
Edwards v. Scott Rural Municipality, (1933) [1934] 1 W. W. Rep. 33,
aff'd [1934] S. C. Rep. 332, had adopted the common enemy rule.
GlIt has been said that the term "common enemy" was first used to
describe this rule as to surface waters in Town of Union v. Durkes, (1875)
38 N. J. L. 21, 22, where Chief Justice Beasley said, "Lord Tenderden
forcibly expressed the legal idea that the surface water was a common
enemy, which every proprietor may fight and get rid of as best he may."
The reference to Lord Tenderden was said to have been to his opinion in
the case of King v. Commissioners of Sewers for Pagham, Sussex, (1828)
8 Barn. & C. 355, 361, which dealt with the waters of the sea and not
with surface waters. For that reason use of the term "common enemy" to
describe the law of surface waters was characterized as misleading. See 3
Farnham, Law of Waters and Water Rights (1904) sec. 889c, pp. 25952596. However, in spite of the fact that the term was taken from a case
dealing with the waters of the sea, it is submitted that it describes with
substantial correctness the fundamental idea upon which the common enemy
rule has been based. See footnote 34 and text.
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rather than the misleading "common law" in referring to this rule.
In the United States, the development of the common enemy
rule was approximately contemporaneous with the development of
the civil law rule, except for the early cases in Louisiana, discussed above. The first case to adopt the common enemy rule
seems to have been the Massachusetts case of Luther v. WinnisimsIZet Co.,52 decided in 1851. Within a short time thereafter the rule

was either applied or approved in additional cases,53 and in 1865
the Massachusetts court decided the case of Gannon v. Hargadonf'
which has since become known as the leading case representing
the common enemy rule. It is significant that, in all of these earlier
cases, the courts did not refer to the civil law rule which was then
being adopted by the courts of other jurisdictions. 5 However, in
more recent cases in which the common enemy rule has been applied, the courts have recognized the existence of the civil law
rule, and have elected expressly to follow the common enemy rule
in preference to it."8
At the present time the courts of the following jurisdictions,
with numerous qualifications and modifications discussed below,
purport to follow the common enemy rule: Arizona, 57 Arkansas,"8
52(1851) 9 Cush. (Mass.) 171.
53
Flagg v. City of Worcester, (1859) 13 Gray (Mass.) 601; Dickinson
v. City of Worcester, (1863) 7 Allen (Mass.) 19; Bangor v. Lansil, (1863)

51 Me. 521; Barry v. City of Lowell, (1864) 8 Allen (Mass.) 127, 85 Am.
Dec. 690; see Parks v. City of Newburyport, (1857) 10 Gray (Mass.) 28,
29; Goodale v. Tuttle, (1864) 29 N. Y. 459, 467. In jurisdictions which
later adopted the common enemy rule, several cases were decided at this
period of time which do not seem to support either the civil law rule or the
common enemy rule. Earl v. De Hart, (1856) 12 N. J. Eq. 280, 72 Am.
Dec. 395; Amick v. Tharp, ;(1856) 13 Grat. (Va.) 564, 67 Am. Dec. 787;
Thomas v. Kenyon, (1861) 1 Daly (N.Y.) 132.
54(1865) 10 Allen (Mass.) 106, 87 Am. Dec. 625. Other cases decided
during this year which followed and applied the common enemy rule are
Greeley v. Maine Central R. R., (1865) 53 Me. 200, and Bowlsby v. Speer,
(1865)
31 N. J. L. 351, 86 Am. Dec. 216.
55
Nor were the courts, in cases decided during or before 1865, aware
of the applicability of the reasonable use doctrine to alterations in the flow
of surface waters, although that doctrine had been applied to interferences
with subterranean percolating waters as early as 1862 in the case of Bassett
v. Salisbury Manufacturing Co., (1862) 43 N. H. 569, 82 Am. Dec. 170,
discussed below at footnotes 79, 85-86 and text.
5
6See, for examples, Le Munyon v. Gallatin Valley Ry., (1921) 60
Mont. 517, 199 Pac. 915; Barkley v. Wilcox, (1881) 86 N. Y. 140, 40 Am.
Rep. 519; Baltzeger v. Carolina Midland Ry., (1899) 54 S. C. 242, 32 S. E.
358, 71 Am. St. Rep. 789; Jordan v. City of Benwood, (1896) 42 W. Va.
312, 526
S. E. 266, 36 L. R. A. 519, 57 Am. St. Rep. 859.
7
Gibson v. Duncan, (1915) 17 Ariz. 329, 152 Pac. 856; see Tucson v.
Dunseath, (1914) 15 Ariz. 355, 359, 139 Pac. 177; Roosevelt Irr. Dist. v.
Beardsley Land & Investment Co., (1929) 36 Ariz. 65, 70, 282 Pac. 937.
See infra, footnotes 124, 171, and 183.
5
8See Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. v. Chapman, (1882) 39 Ark. 463, 473-
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Connecticut,' ° District of Columbia, 0 Indiana, 6 1 Maine,6 2 Massachusetts,"' Mississippi, 4 Missouri,15 Montana, 6 Nebraska,6 7 New
Jersey,"' New Mexico,6s New York,76 North Dakota71 Okla474, 43 Am. Rep. 280; cf. Baker v. Allen, (1899) 66 Ark. 271, 275, 50
S. W. 511, 74 Am. St. Rep. 93. See infra, footnotes 125 and 179.
"'Chadeayne v. Robinson, (1887) 55 Conn. 345, 11 AtI. 592, 3 Am. St.
Rep. 55; Byrne v. Farmington, (1894) 64 Conn. 367, 30 AtI. 138; Rutkoski
v. Zalaski, (1916) 90 Conn. 108, 96 AtI. 365; Tide Water Oil Sales Corp.
v. Shimelman, (1932) 114 Conn. 182, 158 AtI. 229, 81 A. L. R. 256; see
Grant v. Allen, (1874) 41 Conn. 156, 160. See infra, footnote 126.
"'Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Thomas, (1911) 37 App. D. C. 255; Pearce
v. Scott, (1928) 58 App. D. C. 257, 29 F. (2d) 630. See infra, footnote 127.
P'Taylor v. Fickas, (1878) 64 Ind. 167, 31 Am. Rep. 114; Cairo &
V. R. R. v. Stevens, (1881) 73 Ind. 278, 38 Am. Rep. 139; Clay v. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry., (1905) 164 Ind. 439, 73 N. E. 904; Ramsey v.
Ketcham, (1920) 73 Ind. App. 200, 127 N. E. 204. See infra, footnote 128.
62Bangor v. Lansil, (1863) 51 Me. 521; Greeley v. Maine Central R. R.,
(1865) 53 Me. 200; Morrison v. Bucksport & B. R. R., (1877) 67 Me. 353;
Murphy v. Kelly, (1878) 68 Me. 521. See infra, footnotes 121 and 165.
63Luther v. Winnisimmet Co., (1851) 9 Cush. (Mass.) 171; Flagg v.
City of Worcester, (1863) 13 Gray (Mass.) 601; Dickinson v. City of
Worcester, (1863) 7 Allen (Mass.) 19; Gannon v. Hargadon, (1865) 10
Allen (Mass.) 106, 87 Am. Dec. 625; Franklin v. Fisk, (1866) 13 Allen
(Mass.) 211, 90 Am. Dec. 194; Bates v. Smith, (1868) 100 Mass. 181;
Maddock v. City of Springfield, (1932) 281 Mass. 103, 183 N. E. 148. See
infra, footnotes 129 and 166, and also Abbott, Ways and Waters in Massachusetts,
(1915) 28 Harv. L. Rev. 478.
3
'1
Sinai v. Louisville, N. 0. & T. Ry., (1893) 71 Miss. 547, 14 So. 87;
Columbus & G. Ry. v. Taylor, (1928) 149 Miss. 269, 115 So. 200. See infra,
footnotes 130 and 180.
05Several early cases in Missouri appear to have adopted the civil law
rule. Shane v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. R., (1879) 71 Mo. 237, 36
Am. Rep. 480; see Laumier v. Francis, (1856) 23 Mo. 181, 184; McCormick
v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. R., (1879) 70 Mo. 359, 360-361, 35 Am.
Rep. 431. However, since the case of Abbott v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B.
R. R., (1884) 83 Mo. 271, 53 Am. Rep. 581, it has been definitely established that the common enemy rule, subject to certain qualifications, is in
force in Missouri. Adair Drainage District v. Quincy, 0. & K. C. R. R.,
(1919) 280 fo. 244, 217 S. W. 70; see Place v. Union Towniship, (Mo.
App. 1934) 66 S. W. (2d) 584, 586; Tackett v. Linnenbrook, (Mo. App.
1938) 112 S. W. (2d) 160, 163-164. See generally English, The Law of
Surface Water as Applicable to Missouri and States Bounded by Large
Rivers, (1900) 51 Cent. L. J. 360. See also infra, footnote 131.
'A'Le Munyon v. Gallatin Valley Ry., (1921) 60 'Mont. 517, 199 Pac.
915. See infra, footnote 167.
'17Morrissey v. Chicago, B. & K. C. R. R., (1893) 38 Neb. 406, 56 N. W.
946; Mulleisen v. Krueger, (1930) 120 Neb. 380, 232 N. W. 735; see
Annhcuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Peterson, (1894) 41 Neb. 897, 904,
60 N. W. 373; Aldritt v. Fleischauer, (1905) 74 Neb. 66, 69-70, 103 N. W.
1084. See also infra, footnotes 132, 172, and 181.
';"Bowlsby v. Speer, (1865) 31 N. J. L. 351, 86 Am. Dec. 216; FitzPatrick v. Gourley, (1929) 104 N. J. Eq. 281, 145 Atl. 337; Nathanson v.
Wagner, (1935) 118 N. J. Eq. 390, 179 At. 466. See infra, footnotes
133 and 177.
6"Walker v. New Mexico & S. P. R. R., (1897) 165 U. S. 593, 17
Sup. 7 Ct. 421, 41 L. Ed. 837. See infra, footnotes 134 and 168.
0Barkley v. Wilcox, (1881) 86 N. Y. 140, 40 Am. Rep. 519; Bennett v.
Cupina, (1930) 253 N. Y. 436, 171 N. E. 698; Manley v. New York C.
R. R., (1929) 227 App. Div. 206, 237 N. Y. S. 273; Bull v. State of New
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homa,'7 2 Rhode Island.
6

ton," West Virginia,

7

7

3

South Carolina,"4 Virginia, 5 Washing-

and Wisconsin.7

C. THE REASONABLE USE RULE

The reasonable use rule differs markedly from the civil law
and common enemy rules. Under it a possessor of land is not
unqualifiedly privileged to deal with surface water as he pleases,
nor is he absolutely prohibited from interfering with the natural
flow of surface waters to the detriment of others. Each possessor
is legally privileged to make a reasonable use of his land, even
though the flow of surface waters is altered thereby and causes
some harm to others. He incurs liability only when his harmful
interference with the flow of surface water is unreasonable.- The
York, (1931) 231 App. Div. 313, 247 N. Y. S. 183; Carrabis v. Brooklyn
Ash Removal Co., (1936) 249 App. Div. 746, 291 N. Y. S. 840. See infra,
footnote 135.
71See Henderson v. Hines, (1921) 48 N. D. 152, 159-161, 183 N. W.
531. See
(1929) 2 Dakota L. Rev. 365. See also infra, footnotes 136 and 173.
72Taylor v. Shriver, (1921) 82 Okla. 11, 198 Pac. 329; see Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry. v. Groves, (1908) 20 Okla. 101, 111, 93 Pac. 755, 22 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 802; Castle v. Reeburgh, (1919) 75 Okla. 22, 23, 181 Pac. 297. See
infra, footnotes 137, 174, and 195-197.
73See Johnson v. White, (1904) 26 R. I. 207, 208-209, 58 Ad. 658, 65
L. R. A. 250. See also infra, footnotes 112, 117, 138.
74Baltzeger v. Carolina Midland Ry., (1899) 54 S. C. 242, 32 S. E. 358,
71 Am. St. Rep. 789; Lawton v. South Bound R. R., (1901) 61 S. C. 548,
39 S. E. 752; Cannon v. Atlantic C. L. Ry., (1914) 97 S. C. 233, 81 S. E.
476; Rivenbark v. Atlantic C. L. Ry., (1923) 124 S. C. 136, 117 S. E.
206; Fairey v. Southern Ry., (1931) 162 S. C. 129, 160 S. E. 274. See
infra, footnotes 139, 169, and 198-200.
-5See Norfolk & W. R. R. v. Carter, (1895) 91 Va. 587, 592, 22 S. E.
517; McGehee v. Tidewater Ry., (1908) 108 Va. 508, 510, 62 S. E. 356.
See generally (1924) 11 Va. L. Rev. 159; (1928) 15 Va. L. Rev. 177;
(1929)
15 Va. L. Rev. 288. See also infra, footnotes 140, 175, and 182.
76
Wood v. Tacoma, (1911) 66 W2sh. 266, 119 Pac. 859; Morton v.
Hines, (1920) 112 Wash. 612, 192 Pac. 1016; see Cass v. Dicks, (1896)
14 Wash. 75, 78-79, 44 Pac. 113, 53 Am. St. Rep. 859; Miller v. Eastern
Railway & Lumber Co., (1915) 84 Wash. 31, 34, 146 Pac. 171. See infra,
footnote 141.
77Jordan v. City of Benwood, (1896) 42 W. Va. 312, 26 S. E. 266,
36 L.7 R. A. 519, 57 Am. St. Rep. 859. See infra, footnotes 142 and 176.
8Hoyt v. Hudson, (1871) 27 Wis. 656, 9 Am. Rep. 473; O'Connor v.
Fond du Lac, A. & P. Ry., (1881) 52 Wis. 526, 9 N. W. 287, 38 Am. Rep.
753; Johnson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., (1891) 80 Wis. 641, N. W.
771, 14 L. R. A. 495, 27 Am. St. Rep. 76; Champion v. Crandon, (1893)
84 Wis. 405, 54 N. W. 775, 19 L. R. A. 856; Harvie v. Caledonia, (1915)
161 Wis. 314, 154 N. W. 383. See generally (1929) 5 Wis. L. Rev. 239.
See also infra, footnotes 143 and 170.
75
The reasonable use rule was first applied in a case involving interferences with the flow of subterranean p5ercolating waters, Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., (1862) 43 N. H. 569, 577, 82 Am. Dec. 170. The rule was
stated in the following language: ". . . a man may exercise his own right
on his own land as he pleases, provided he does not interfere with the
rights of others. The rights are correlative, and, from the necessity, of the
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issue of reasonableness or unreasonableness is a question of fact
to be determined in each case upon a consideration of all the relevant circumstances, including such factors as the amount of harm
caused, the foreseeability of the harm on the part of the possessor
making the alteration in the flow, the purpose or motive with which
he acted, and others."
This rule of reasonable use differs from the other two rules in
that it does not purport to lay down any specific rights or privileges with respect to surface waters, but leaves the whole matter
to be determined upon the facts of each case in accordance with
general principles of fairness and common sense. Its proponents
advance convincing arguments in its favor by comparison with
the other two rules. The best of these is found in the New Hampshire case of Franklin v. Durgee,81 and since it would be gilding
the lily to attempt an improvement on the masterful argument of
Justice \Walker in that case, the writers take the privilege of quot2
ing at length from his opinion :S
"If the owner of land has absolute and unlimited domain
thereof, wholly independent and irrespective of his neighbors'
case, the right of each is only to a reasonable user or management; and
whatever exercise of one's right or use of one's privilege, in such case is,
under all the circumstances, and in view of the rights of others, such a
reasonable user or management is not an infringement of the rights of
others; but any interference by one land-owner with the natural drainage,
injurious to the land of another, and not reasonable, is unjustifiable. Every
interference by one land-owner with the natural drainage, actually injurious
to the land of another, would be unreasonable, if not made by the former
in the reasonable use of his own property."
Subsequently, the reasonable use rule was applied to a case involving
an interference with the flow of surface waters: Swett v. Cutts, (1870)
50 N. H. 439, 446, 9 Am. Rep. 276, where it was said, "The doctrine which
we maintain adapts itself to the ever varying circumstances of each particular case,-from that which makes a near approach to a natural watercourse, down by imperceptible gradations to the case of mere percolation,
giving to each land owner, while in the reasonable use and improvement of
his land, the right to make reasonable modifications of the flow of such
water in and upon his land." See also Flanders v. Franklin, (1899) 70 N. H.
168, 169, 47 Atl. 88; Bush v. City of Rochester, (1934) 191 Minn. 591, 593594, 255 N. W. 256.
sOIn Swett v. Cutts, (1870) 50 N. H. 439, 446, 9 Am. Rep. 276, it was
said, "In determining this question all the circumstances of the case would of
course be considered; and among them the nature and importance of the
improvements sought to be made, the extent of the interference with the
water, and the amount of injury done to the other land owners as compared
with the value of such improvements, and also whether such injury could or
could not have been reasonably foreseen." See also Rindge v. Sargent,
(1886) 64 N. H. 294, 294-295, 9 Atl. 723. Priest v. Boston & M. R. R.,
(1901) 71 N. H. 114, 51 Atl. 667; Bush v. City of Rochester, (1934) 191
Minn. 591, 594, 255 N. W. 256.
81(1901) 71 N. H. 186, 51 Ad. 911, 58 L. R. A. 112.
82
1 The quotation is taken from 71 N. H. 187-191.
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enjoyment of their contiguous lands, he may with impunity wholly
prevent the natural flow of surface water upon his land, and cause
it to flow back upon the adjacent owner's land by means of an
embankment or other obstruction erected upon the division line;
and he would be entitled to thus inflict immense damage upon
others' property, not because he might derive some advantage
from the operation or because it is a reasonably necessary method
of developing and improving his land, but merely because the land
is his .... In other words, it is held in numerous cases that the
landowner, by virtue of his proprietorship alone, has the unqualified right at common law to divert or obstruct the natural flow of
surface water coming upon his land....
"Other courts reach an opposite result by adopting the rule
of the civil law with reference to surface waters....
"By the rule of unlimited ownership of land, the defendants
in this case could captiously maintain the embankment complained
of, while by the rule of the civil law the plaintiff could with equal
disregard of the defendants' property insist upon their removing
the obstruction and allowing the water to flow naturally from one
estate upon the other. The frequent hardship and practical injustice of applying one of these formulas strictly and exclusively has
in some cases apparently resulted in the application of the other,
and two opposing rules have thus been evolved in different jurisdictions from the inherent injustice of both. Because under some
circumstances the upper proprietor would suffer great damage if
the lower proprietor, with little or no advantage to himself, were
allowed to interrupt the natural flow of surface water, it has been
determined that the former has an absolute right, in all cases, to
have the water flow upon the land of the latter; and because, under
other circumstances, similar damage would result to the lower
proprietor if he were not allowed to divert the water, it has been
determined that he may do so in all cases without regard to the
damage thus caused to the upper proprietor. It has seemed to
some courts that an inflexible rule must be applied in such cases,
though its practical effect is oftener attended with great hardship
than with substantial justice.s3 But when the hardship becomes
sufficiently excessive, means have been devised in some cases to
avoid it, in jurisdictions where one rule or the other is generally
-ecognized, and some approach to the doctrine of reasonableness
s3Substantially the same point was considered in Swett v. Cutts, (1870)
50 N. H. 439, 446, 9 Am. Rep. 276, where it was said, "To give the land
owner the absolute and unqualified right of disposing of such water would,
in many instances, be productive of great mischief to his neighbors, and
lead to interminable struggles between them; for the same power to deal
with such water would exist in each land owner when it was on his land.
"In many instances the water would assume so much of the character
of a natural water-course as to make the application of such a doctrine odious
and unjust, while, at the same time, a ":otal want of power to modify such
flow to meet the necessities of the land owner would often stand in the
way of valuable improvements which might be made without serious detriment to any one."
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has been made. In Vanderweile v. Taylor, 65 N. Y. 341, the fact
is recognized 'that the rule which would be applicable to surface
water in agricultural districts must be somewhat modified in its'
application to city lots.' But to relax the rule for that reason is in
effect the adoption of the rule of reasonable user. If ownership
alone is the test, the location of the land, whether in the city or in
the country, becomes immaterial. It is only important in its bearing upon the legal rights of the parties when those rights are
ascertained, in part at least, by a reasonable regard for the proper
enjoyment by each of his adjacent land.
"In Livingston v. McDonald, 21 Ia. 160, 164, Judge Dillon
says: 'We recognize the fact (to use Lord Tenterden's expression)
that surface water or slough water is a common enemy which each
landowner may reasonably get rid of in the best manner possible;
but in relieving himself he must respect the rights of his neighbor,
and cannot be justified by an act having the direct tendency and
effect to make that enemy less dangerous to himself and more
dangerous to his neighbor. He cannot make his estate more valuable by an act which unnecessarily renders his neighbor's less
valuable.' Many other cases recognize the importance, in the proper
administration of justice in such cases, of limiting the rights of
both to the reasonably beneficial enjoyment by both of their contiguous lands ....84
"The common-law right of the ownership of land, in its relation
to the control of surface water, as understood by the courts of this
state for many years, does not sanction or authorize practical injustice to one landowner by the arbitrary and unreasonable exercise
of the right of dominion by another, based on a narrow view of
the effect of land titles. Rightly understood and judiciously applied, the law in this respect protects every one in the reasonable
enjoyment of his property, and imposes upon none burdensome
servitudes for the benefit of others by the strict enforcement of a
technical rule of ownership briefly expressed in an ancient maxim.
Reasonableness is the vital principle of the common law ...
"If the correlative rights of adjoining owners in the control of
surface water ... is peculiar to the jurisprudence of this state,....
the principle involved is based upon a broader ground of justice
than attends the practical operation of either of the extreme views
above noted, and is recognized as an essential element in many
cases in other jurisdictions, as has been already shown. The question presented in such cases is not so much one of law as of fact.
It would doubtless be convenient if it could always be answered by
citing a stereotyped definition of legal right. But as the situation
of all adjoining owners of land is not the same, and as the circumstances attending the use of land in view of the flow of surface
water are infinitely various, the failure to attain substantial justice
,'A number of jurisdictions purporting to follow the common enemy
rule have modified and qualified that rule in line with the point here made
by Justice Walker. See infra, footnotes 179-185 and text.
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by the enforcement in all cases of a rule of law which does not
recognize these important differences is not surprising. The result
is that the question of the reasonableness of the use in a given case
must be determined as a question of fact under all the attendant
circumstances."
At the present time only two jurisdictions can be fairly said
to have adopted the full reasonable use rule-New Hampshire and
Minnesota. In New Hampshire the principle of reasonable use,
now applied to all cases involving conflicting uses of neighboring
land, 85 was originally developed and applied in the case of Bassett v. Salisbury Manufacturing Co.,86 decided in 1862 and involvCutts, 7
ing an obstruction of subterranean percolation. In Swett z,.

decided in 1870, the principle was applied where a harmful alteration in the flow of surface water was involved, and it has consis.tently been followed and applied in New Hampshire since that
time to cases involving interferences with the flow of surface
waters.8 81
In Minnesota the development of the reasonable use rule followed a different course. The earliest Minnesota cases purported
to adopt the common enemy rule, 89 but with several important
qualifications. These qualifications were that a possessor of land
was subject to liability for harm caused by an alteration in the
flow of surface water which resulted from an extraordinary use
of his land,90 for harm caused urmecessarily,91 for harm caused
by collecting surface water in an artificial channel and discharging it upon other land, 2 and for harm caused by negligently ob85

See footnote 2.
43 N. H. 569, 82 Am. Dec. 170.
87(1870) 50 N. H. 439, 9 Am. Rep. 276.
88
Rindge v. Sargent, (1886) 64 N. H. 294, 9 Ati. 723; Priest v. Boston
& M. R. R., (1901) 71 N. H. 114, 51 AtI. 667; Franklin v. Durgee, (1901)
71 N. H. 186, 51 Atl. 911, 58 L. R. A. 112; see Flanders v. Franklin, (1899)
70 N.89 H. 168, 169, 47 Ati. 88.
Rowe v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., (1889) 41 Minn. 384, 43 N. V. 76,
16 Am. St. Rep. 706; Jordan v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., (1889) 42 Minn.
172, 43 N. W. 849, 6 L. R. A. 573; see O'Brien v. St. Paul, (1878) 25 Minn.
331, 334-336, 33 Am. Rep. 470; Hogenson v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., (1883)
31 Minn. 224, 226, 17 N. W. 374; Pye v. Mankato, (1887) 36 Minn. 373,
374-375, 31 N. W. 863, 1 Am. St. Rer. 671; Beach v. Gaylord, (1890) 43
476, 479, 45 N. W. 1095.
Minn.
90
0'Brien v. St. Paul, (1878) 25 Minn. 331, 335, 33 Am. Rep. 470.
See also Jordan v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., (1889) 42 Minn. 172, 175, 43
N. W.
849, 6 L. R. A. 573.
91
Pye v. Mankato, (1887) 36 Minn. 373, 374-375, 31 N. W. 863, 1 Am.
St. Rep. 671. See also Beach v. Gaylord, (1890) 43 Minn. 476, 479, 45
N. W.
1095.
92Hogenson v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., (1883) 31 Minn. 224, 17 N. W.
374; Blakely v. Devine, (1886) 36 Minn. 53, 29 N. W. 342; Pye v. Mankato, (1887) 36 Minn. 373, 31 N. W. 863, 1 Am. St. Rep. 671; Beach v.
86(1862)
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structing the flow of surface water through deep natural ravines
and gullies." These various qualifications were modified and generalized to some extent in the later case of Sheehan v. Flynn 4
especially with respect to the rule that a possessor of land was
subject to liability for harm caused by collecting surface water in
artificial channels and discharging it upon other land. In that case
the court enunciated a general rule to the effect that a possessor
of land was privileged to alter the flow of surface water so long
as he used reasonable care 95 and did not cause unnecessary or
unreasonable harm to othersY6 The court also said that, in determining reasonableness in a given case, all of the relevant circumstances should be considered, 9 7 including the amount of benefit to
Gaylord, (1890) 43 Minn. 476, 45 N. W. 1095; Follman v. Mankato, (1891)
45 Minn. 457, 48 N. W. 192. However, a dictum in a case decided during
this time indicates that this qualification of the general rule was perhaps not
as broad as stated in the text. In Jordan v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., (1889)
42 Minn. 172, 175-176, 43 N. W. 849, 6 L. R. A. 573, it was said, "The right
to use and improve one's own land does not, however, include the right to
do so merely by transferring from its surface waters naturally resting upon
it to the land of another. It is only where such shifting of the burden follows
as an incident to using or improving his land as such land is ordinarilyitsed
or improved, that it can be justified." (Italics added.)
This dictum was subsequently expanded and applied in Brown v.
Winona & Southwestern Ry., (1893) 53 Minn. 259, 55 N. W. 123, 39 Am.

St. Rep. 603.

-3McClure v. Red Wing, (1881) 28 Minn. 186, 9 N. W. 767; see Rowe
v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., (1889) 41 Minn. 384, 387, 43 N. W. 76, 16 Am. St.
Rep. 706. In the McClure case Justice Mitchell stated on pages 192-193 the
basis of this qualification as follows: ".

.

. the general common-law doctrine

that neither the retention nor repulsion of surface water is an actionable
In a broken and bluffy
injury must necessarily be materially modified ....
region of the country . . ., intersected by long, deep coulees or ravines, surrounded by high, steep hills or bluffs, down which large quantities of water
from rain or melting snow rush with the rapidity of a torrent, often attaining the volume of a small river, and usually following a well-defined channel, it would be manifestly inappropriate and unjust to apply the rules of
the common law applicable to ordinary surface water. In many respects
such streams partake more of the nature of natural streams than of ordinary
surface water, and must, at least to a certain extent, be governed by the
same rules."
04 (1894) 59 Minn. 436, 61 N. W. 462, 26 L. R. A. 632.
'-'On page 442 it was said, "This is a reasonable doctrine, that takes
into consideration all the circumstances of each case. It gives to each man
the common-law right to improve and enjoy his own property to its fullest
extent, but limited by the requirement that he use reasonable care in disposing of surface water, which the common law did not always require him
to do. When he has used such reasonable care, he can generally stand on
his common-law rights..

.

5W"The common-law rule as to liability for the diversion of surface
water has been modified in this and other states by the rule that a person
must so use his own as not unnecessarily or unreasonably to injure his
neighbor." Ibid p. 441.
07"This is a reasonable doctrine, that takes into consideration all the
circumstances of each case." Ibid, p. 442.
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the possessor making the alteration as compared to the harm caused
to others,98 and the topography of the land in the vicinityY' Applying these principles, the court decided that the defendant, a
possessor of land, was privileged in draining onto the plaintiff's
land, by artificial means, surface water which had accumulated
upon his own land in a natural depression. 00 The extent to which
this case departed from the narrower rules and exceptions developed in earlier Minnesota cases is to be noted, as is the evolution made in the case toward recognition and adoption of the broad
principle of reasonable use. In the cases decided since Sheehan v.
Flynn, the court, for the most part, has continued to apply the
general principles as there developed, but many of these cases
reveal a distinct tendency toward a complete recognition and adop9s"A circumstance to be considered in determining what is a reasonable
use of one's own land is the amount of benefit to the estate drained or
improved, as compared with the amount of injury to the estate on which the
burden of the surface water is cast." Ibid, p. 441.
99"We hold that one has a right to drain his land for any legitimate
use, whether for a railroad track, a wheat field, or a pasture, and whether
the improvement is directly and wholly for the purpose of drainage, or
whether it is for some other purpose, and such drainage is a mere incidental
result. But, if he collect and convey the surface water off his own land, he
shall do what is reasonable under all the circumstances, to turn it into
some natural drain, or into some course in which it will do the least injury
to his neighbor,--and, if he would prevent it from coming upon his land,
he must not do so by obstructing some natural drain, and thereby hold
back the water and flood the land of his neighbor, at least if such natural
drain is an important one." Ibid. p. 449.
lOOThe facts of the Sheehan Case are interesting. Defendant and
plaintiff each owned a parcel of land, the defendant's being situated on a
level some forty feet higher than plaintiff's. The two parcels did not adjoin,
but were separated by a third parcel of land. On defendant's land was
situated a depression which, in times of rain and melting snow, became
filled with surface water to a depth of as much as four feet, and which
covered an area of about twenty acres of high grade agricultural land.
Defendant commenced digging a ditch from the depression to the head of a
small ravine on his land. If the ditch were completed, the ravine would
carry the water across the intervening parcel of land, across plaintiff's land,
and into a small lake partially situated upon plaintiff's land. The result
would be to raise the level of the water in the lake so as to submerge from
one to two acres of plaintiff's land during a short period of time each spring
season. It was found that defendant's proposed ditch was necessary to drain
the surface water from the depression, and that it was the only reasonable
method by which the surface water could be drained from the depression.
In holding that the defendant was privileged to drain the surface water in
this manner, the court said, on page 449, "Applying these principles to the
present case, we are of the opinion that these limitations on the commonlaw right of the owner to improve his land so as to rid it of surface water
do not prohibit this defendant from draining this depression in the manner
proposed. As before stated, it fairly appears that this is the only way he
could reasonably drain this depression, and that this ravine is the only
natural drain reasonably accessible; and the consequent injury to others is
not so great, as compared to the benefit to be derived from the improvement,
as to make it unreasonable on that account."
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tion of the full reasonable use rule.Y1 In the most recent case,
02
Bush v. City of Rochester,1
the Minnesota court seems to adopt
that rule in its fullest extent, but there is still some carry-over of
the earlier concepts. 0 3
'O'Shortly after the decision in the Sheehan Case, the court apparently
adopted the full, reasonable use rule. In Gilfillan v. Schmidt, (1896) 64
Minn. 29, 36, 66 N. W. 126, 31 L. R. A. 547, 58 Am. St. Rep. 515, Mr.
Justice Mitchell said, "No person has the absolute and unqualified legal right
to the use of his own property unaffected by the reasonable use by his
neighbor of his property. The use by my neighbor of his property in a
particular way may discommode and injuriously affect me in the enjoyment
of my property; but, if his use is a reasonable one, I must submit to any
resulting inconvenience. The question, after all, is really one of reasonable
use. . .

."

In some subsequent cases, however, the court seems to have

departed somewhat from this broad approach. See for example: Jungblum
v. Minneapolis, N. U. & S. W. R. R., (1897) 70 Minn. 153, 72 N. W. 971;
Robbins v. Willmar, (1898) 71 Minn. 403, 73 N. W. 1097; Oftelie v. Hammond, (1899) 78 Minn. 275, 80 N. W. 1123; Gunnerus v. Spring Prairie,
(1904) 91 Minn. 473, 98 N. W. 340; Werner v. Popp, (1905) 94 Minn. 118,
102 N. W. 366, aff'd on rehearing, 94 Minn. 521, 103 N. W. 164; Ginter v.
St. Mark's Church, (1905) 95 Minn. 14, 103 N. W. 738, 69 L. R. A. 621,
111 Am. St. Rep. 438; Nye v. Kahlow, (1906) 98 Minn. 81, 107 N. W. 733;
O'Neill v. St. Paul, (1908) 104 Minn. 491, 116 N. W. 114; Peterson v.
Lundquist, (1908) 106 Minn. 339, 119 N. W. 50; Lieberknecht v. Great
Northern Ry., (1911) 114 Minn. 55, 129 N. W. 1047; Howard v. Illinois
Central Ry., (1911) 114 Minn. 189, 130 N. W. 946; Praught v. Bukosky,
(1911) 116 Minn. 206, 133 N. W. 564; Watre v. Great Northern Ry.,
(1914) 127 Minn. 118, 149 N. W. 18; Skinner v. Great Northern Ry.,
(1915) 129 Minn. 113, 151 N. W. 968; Peterson v. Northern Pacific Ry.,
(1916) 132 Minn. 265, 156 N. W. 121; Kiefer v. County of Ramsey, (1918)
140 Minn. 143, 167 N. W. 362; Hartle v. Neighbauer, (1919) 142 Minn.
438, 172 N. W. 498; Town of King v. Brekke, (1922) 151 Minn. 474, 187
N. W. 515; Sandmeier v. St. James, (1925) 165 Minn. 34, 205 N. W. 634;
Simonson v. Township of Alden, (1930) 181 Minn. 200, 231 N. W. 921.
Although the language used in these cases does not consistently reveal
the same broad understanding of the reasonable use principle found in the
New Hampshire cases, an examination of the facts of each case and the
result arrived at demonstrates that the court in each case achieved a
result entirely consistent with that principle. Furthermore, the court's
language occasionally indicates a full understanding of it. In Rieck v.
Schamanski, (1912) 117 Minn. 25, 32, 134 N. W. 228, for example, it was
said, "The rule of reasonable use has been recognized.. . '" And in Hopkins v. Taylor, (1915) 128 Minn. 511, 512, 151 N. W. 194, it was said,
"Whether the course pursued follows the natural course of drainage is an
important factor in determining the question of reasonable use, but it is not
controlling." Compare Philips v. Taylor, (1904) 93 Minn. 28, 29-30, 100
N. W. 649; Block v. Great Northern Ry., (1907) 101 Minn. 183, 185, 112
N. W. 66; Erhard v. Wagner, (1908) 104 Minn. 258, 261-262, 116 N. W.
577. See Note, (1918) 2 MINNEsoTA LAw REv w 449, for a discussion
of the Minnesota law of surface waters in force during this period of time.
Compare the cases from other jurisdictions following a similar rule. See
infra, footnotes 179-185.
102(1934) 191 Minn. 591, 255 N. W. 256.

10 3"By the rule of the common law, adhered to by this court, a landowner may within reason appropriate to his own use or expel from his land
all mere surface water. Surface water is regarded as a common enemy
which each proprietor may fight or rid himself of as he chooses. ...
[Italics added].... The spread and diffusion of water over adjacent land

is recognized as a necessary consequence of improvement. What is [a]
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In view of the demonstrable soundness and desirability of the
reasonable use rule, it seems a little strange that only two jurisdictions in this country have fully adopted it as the basic measure
of the rights and liabilities arising out of interferences with the
flow of surface waters. It has been in existence almost as long
as the civil law and common enemy rules, and most of the writers
on water law have recognized it as a distinct rule for some time.' 0'
Perhaps the courts of New Hampshire and Minnesota are not
highly regarded in other jurisdictions, but their decisions are cited
frequently and discussed with approval in cases from other states.
Probably the best explanation is that these other courts have not
fully understood the reasonable use principle. 1'0 For example,
some courts have cited reasonable use cases as supporting the common enemy rule."0 8 Others have discussed them at length and then
misinterpreted or misapplied their language.1 0 7 Still others, and
probably the majority, simply assume that there are only two rules
governing surface waters-the civil law and common enemy rules
-and have completely ignored or overlooked the reasonable use
idea as a fundamental principle.108 Itis significant, however, that
reasonable use is subject to question and in many cases must be determined
by the jury upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In our
cases the terms negligence .

. .,

trespass .

. .,

and nuisance . . . are some-

times loosely applied to the improper diversion of surface waters. Even in
Sheehan v. Flynn . . .the phrase 'reasonable care' is sometimes used where
obviously 'reasonable use' is intended. The common law doctrine as there
modified is still in force in this state. [Italics added.] The disposition of
surface water must be 'reasonable under all the circumstances,' and the
consequent injury to others must not be so great, as compared to the benefit
as to make it unreasonable on that account."
derived,
104 See Gould, Law of Waters (3d ed. 1900) sec. 265, p. 539; Farnham,
Law of .Waters and Water Rights (1904) sec. 889c, p. 2597; Thornton,
Surface Water on Agricultural Lands, (1883) 17 Cent. L. J. 62, 67; Rood,
Surface Water in Cities, (1908) 6 Mic'i. L. Rev. 448, 460.
oOne of the very rare instances in which the judge of a court of some
jurisdiction other than Minnesota or New Hampshire has displayed an
understanding of the fundamental principle of reasonable use is the dissenting opinion of Justice Stuart in the Canadian case of Makowecki v. Yachimyc, 0 (Alberta 1917) 34 Dom. L. Rep. 130, 146.
' In Barkley v. Wilcox, (1881) 86 N. Y. 140, 145, 40 Am. Rep. 519,
the case of Swett v. Cutts, (1870) 50 N. H. 439, 9 Am. Rep. 276, discussed at footnote 87 and text, was cited as supporting the common enemy
rule.
07
In Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. v. Chapman, (1882) 39 Ark. 463, 478,
43 Am. Rep. 280, the court cited and discussed with apparent approval the
cases of Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., (1862) 43 N. H. 569, 82 Am. Dec.
170, and Swett v. Cutts, (1870) 50 N. H. 439, 9 Am. Rep. 276, which are
considered supra, at footnotes 86-87 aid text. Yet the Arkansas Court
developed principles in that case which approached the reasonable use doctrine no more closely than the principles developed in the case of Sheehan v.
Flynn, (1894) 59 Minn. 436, 61 N. W. 462, 26 L. R. A. 632, considered
supra, at footnotes 94-100 and text.
losSee supra footnotes 14 and 55.
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even though the broad principle of reasonable use has not made
much headway as an articulate basis of decision, substantially all
of the jurisdictions which purport to follow the civil law or common enemy rules have engrafted upon them numerous qualifications and exceptions which, in actual result, produce decisions
which are not as conflicting as would be expected, and which would
generally be reached under the reasonable use rule. It therefore
seems desirable, in view of the apparent incompatibility of the
various rules, to indicate the nature and scope of these modifications and qualifications.
D.

MODIFICATIONS OF THE CIVIL LAW AND

COMMON ENEMY RULES
Most of the courts committed to the civil law or common enemy
rules have recognized that a strict application of the letter of these
rules works injustice in some cases, and that there is thus a need
for some of the flexibility inherent in the reasonable use doctrine.10 9 Frequently, however, in attempting to avoid the undesirable results incident to a strict application of the two rules in
particular situations, these courts have developed specific qualifications to the rules which are as arbitrary and inflexible as the
general rules themselves.
Perhaps the best illustration of what has been done in this
respect can be achieved by grouping the most common types of
situations into separate categories and indicating the specific rules
applied to each category.
1. APPROPRIATION OF SURFACE WATER. In this type of situation it is uniformly said to be the rule that the possessor of higher
land has an unqualified privilege to appropriate surface water
thereon, and thus prevent it from flowing to adjacent lower land;
and that the possessor of the lower land has no right to the continued flow of the surface water to his land.110 This rule, in accord
1oIn Martin v. Jett, (1838) 12 La. 501, 505, 32 Am. Dec. 120, the court,
in considering the phase of the civil law rule which prohibits the upper
possessor from discharging surface water upon lower land, said, "We are
by no means disposed to give to the code such an interpretation as would,
in effect, condemn to sterility the superior estate. That every man has a
right to clear and cultivate his land, cannot be doubted. The clearing of
land, and fitting it for agricultural purposes, is not calculated to render

this kind of servitude more onerous." Accord, Kauffman v. Griesemer,
(1856) 26 Pa. St. 407, 414, 67 Am. Dec. 437. See also the cases cited infra,
in footnotes 179-185, which apply a qualified common enemy rule which
is flexible.
" 0OTo this effect are: Gould, Law of Waters (3d ed. 1900) sec. 279,
p. 555; 3 Farnham, Law of Waters and Water Rights (1904) sec. 883,
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with the common enemy principle,"' and followed in common
enemy jurisdictions,:"2 is based upon a narrow conception of the
effect of land ownership."' Nevertheless, it has been adopted in
jurisdictions committed to the civil law rule," 4 as well as in some
of the few jurisdictions in which the courts have not yet clearly
accepted any one of the three major views of the law of surface
waters." 5
Although this rule that a possessor of land has an unlimited
and unqualified privilege of appropriation is generally stated in
very broad terms," 6 an examination of the cases in which a possessor was actually held to be privileged to appropriate surface
water reveals that in each case the appropriator did so for the
p. 2572; Greatrex v. Hayward, (1853) 8 Exch. 291, 22 L. J. Ex. 137;
Rawstron v. Taylor, (1855) 11 Exch. 359, 25 L. J. Ex. 33; Broadbent v.
Ramsbotham, (1856) 11 Exch. 602, 25 L. J. Ex. 115, 4 W. R. 290; Thomson, Surface Waters, (1889) 23 Am. L. Rev. 372, 380-382; Dillon, Law of
Surface Waters, (1867) 1 Western Jurist 12, 14-15; (1905) 18 Harv. L.
Rev. 626.
lSee supra, footnote 34 and text.
'1-Buffum v. Harris, (1858) 5 R. I. 243; see Town v. Missouri Pac.
Ry., (1895) 50 Neb. 768, 774, 70 N. W. 402.
'13In Livingston v. McDonald, (1866) 21 Iowa 160, 167, 89 Am. Dec.
563, it was said, "This right of the higher owner thus to retain, and if he
sees fit, to appropriate all of his surface waters to his own use, is based
upon his dominion over the soil which extends indefinitely upwards and
downwards, and is adopted as favoring the reclamation and improvement
of wet and miry lands." And in Thomson, Surface Waters, (1889) 23 Am.
L. Rev. 372, 380, it was said, "Surface and percolating waters are deemed
by the law to belong absolutely to -the owner of the land upon which they
are found ....
The upper proprietor may drain it away or retain it upon
his premises in reservoirs at his pleasure ...
"
See also Note, (1929)
15 Va. L. Rev. 288, 289.
"l4Benson v. Cook, (1924) 47 S. D. 611, 201 N. W. 526; Terry v.
Heppner, (1931) 59 S. D. 317, 239 N. W. 759; see Gibbs v. Williams,
(1881) 25 Kan. 214, 217, 37 Am. Rep. 241 ; Livingston v. McDonald, (1866)
21 Iowa 160, 166-167, 89 Am. Dec. 563. At the time the last two cases cited
were decided, the courts of those jurisdi:tions had not yet clearly adopted
the civil law rule. See supra, footnotes 21-22. It has been said that
under the civil law the upper possessor was not privileged to appropriate
surface water so as to prevent it from flowing to lower lands. 1 Domat,
The Civil Law (Cush. ed. 1850) Art. 1583, p. 616; Note, (1935) 15 Bos.
U. L. Rev. 892, 896-897; Note, (1929) 15 Va. L. Rev. 288, 289. Cf. Swiss
Civil Code (1907) Art. 689, which is to the effect that the upper possessor
is privileged to appropriate surface water only so far as it is indispensable
to the upper land.
"'Garns v. Rollins, (1912) 41 Utah 260, 125 Pac. 867, Ann. Cas. 1915C
1159, commented on in (1912) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 186; Boynton & Moseley v.
Gilman, (1880) 53 Vt. 17; State v. Hiber, (1935) 48 Wyo. 172, 44 P. (2d)
1005. See also the English cases cited supra, in footnote 110.
":8 In Benson v. Cook, (1924) 47 S. D. 611, 617, 201 N. W. 526, the
rule was stated as follows: ". . . . it is the settled rule, and a rule from
which we believe there is no dissenting voice, that the owner of land has
the absolute right to the surface water found thereon, and that he may
retain such water for his own use and prevent it from flowing upon the
land of another."
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purpose of conferring upon himself materially valuable benefits.117
This being so, it would seem that the usual statement is much too
broad, and that the rule should be stated in terms which more
closely correspond to the actual decisions.1 :1 Moreover, the fact
that in each of these cases the upper possessor appropriated the
surface water only for some beneficial purpose lends at least inferential support to the view that the reasonable use doctrine is
applicable to this situation as well as to situations involving alterations in the flow of surface water.". 9
117In Greatrex v. Hayward, (1853) 8 Exch. 291, 22 L. J. Ex. 137;
Broadbent v. Ramsbotham, (1856) 11 Exch. 602, 25 L. J. Ex. 115, 4 W. R.
290; and Buffum v. Harris, (1858) 5 R. I. 243, the upper possessor prevented the surface water from flowing to the lower possessor's land by
laying drains for the purpose of more effectively draining the higher land.
In Rawstron v. Taylor, (1855) 11 Exch. 369, 25 L. J. Ex. 33, the purpose
was to drain the upper possessor's land and to supply his tenants with water
for domestic uses. In Benson v. Cook, (1924) 47 S. D. 611, 201 N. W.
526; Terry v. Heppner, (1931) 59 S. D. 317, 239 N. W. 759; and Garns v.
Rollins, (1912) 41 Utah 260, 125 Pac. 867, Ann. Cas. 1915C 1159, the surface water was appropriated for irrigation purposes. In Boynton & Moseley
v. Gilman, (1880) 53 Vt. 17, the possessor of the land granted to defendant
a license to lay an aqueduct upon the land and to appropriate the surface
water upon it, presumably for commercial uses. And in State v. Hiber,
(1935) 48 Wyo. 172, 44 P. (2d) 1005, the surface water was appropriated
for the purpose of supplying livestock with water.
11
8In support of this conclusion is the fact that some courts, apparently
for the purpose of avoiding the rule, have extended the definition of a
watercourse so as to include sizeable, periodic streams of surface water,
thus denying the upper possessor an unqualified privilege of appropriation.
See, for example, Hoefs v. Short, (1925) 114 Tex. 501, 273 S. W. 785,
40 A. L. R. 833.
" In the comment on Garns v. Rollins, (1912) 41 Utah 260, 125 Pac.
867, Ann. Cas. 1915C 1159, in (1912) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 186, it was said,
"It is submitted that the argument of social utility, which was mainly
responsible for the introduction of the reasonable use doctrine as to percolating waters, is equally applicable to surface waters." Cf. (1905) 18 Harv. L.
Rev. 626.
Legal writers have sometimes stated that in New Hampshire the reasonable use doctrine governs cases of appropriation. See 3 Farnham, Law of
Waters and Water Rights (1904), sec. 883, p. 2572; Thomson, Surface
Waters (1889) 23 Am. L. Rev. 372, 381. Although no New Hampshire
case has been found in which the court so decided, it would seem that, in
view of the extensive application of that doctrine to other situations, (see
footnote 1), this conclusion is correct. Dicta can sometimes be found to
the effect that the reasonable use doctrine applies to the appropriation of
surface water by an upper possessor. See, for example, Bush v. City of
Rochester, (1934) 191 'Minn. 591, 592, 255 N. W. 256, where it was said,
"...

a landowner may within reason appropriate to his own use . . . all

mere surface water." [Italics added.]
See also Thompson v. New Haven Water Co., (1913) 86 Conn. 597,
86 At. 585, 45 L. R. A. (N.S.) 457. In that case flood water which escaped
from a watercourse flowed in a diffused state across plaintiff's nearby meadow
and deposited thereon a valuable fertilizer. Between the meadow and the
watercourse defendant laid a conduit, and in constructing the conduit defendant excavated earth and threw it up so as to form a continuous embankment across the place where the flood water flowed to plaintiff's meadow.
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2.

DISCHARGE OF SURFACE WATER BY ARTIFICIAL MEANS.

Surface water may, by artificial means, be caused to flow upon
adjoining land in increased volume, or with greater velocity, or in
a course different from that which the water naturally followed.
Artificial channels may be made which concentrate surface water
previously flowing upon the land in a diffused state or which drain
previously stagnant surface water collected in natural or artificial
depressions. Embankments may be constructed which have the
effect of gathering diffused surface water and diverting it upon
adjoining land in a volume. Depressions and sag holes may be
filled, the level of land raised, or its surface graded so as to discharge surface water upon adjoining land which did not previously
receive it. The ways and combinations of ways in which surface
water may, by human activity, be made to flow upon adjoining
land in a non-natural way seem to be infinitely varied. The specific
rules applied to these variations, however, are more or less uniform, and therefore it seems expedient, though at the expense of
complete accuracy, to make this general category for the purpose
of showing how the civil law and common enemy rules have been
modified in these situations.
From the rationale of the common enemy rule, 120 it would seem
that a possessor of land has an unlimited privilege to rid his land
of the surface water upon it or to alter its course by whatever
means he wishes, irrespective of the manner of doing it or the
harm thereby caused to others. However, in substantially all of
the jurisdictions purportedly committed to that rule, the courts
have refused to go that far.121 Most of these courts have developed
As a result the flood water was prevented from flowing across plaintiff's
meadow and depositing the valuable fertilizer thereon. Plaintiff brought an
action to recover damages for the resulting reduction in value of his hay
crops. In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, the court said on pages
607-608, "The evidence discloses that "ledefendant, the upper proprietor,
has not attempted to appropriate the flood water reaching his land in the
improvement or enjoyment of such land, or to interfere with or affect the
flow of the water for any purpose connected with that land. The embankment, in so far as appears, or can be imagined, neither serves, nor was
intended to serve, an useful purpose.... We thus have a situation in which
the plaintiff was damaged in his property by an act of the defendant in
interfering with the natural flow of flood water, which had no justification
in the improvement, use, enjoyment, or protection of its land. Damage done
under such circumstance cannot, with due regard for property rights, be
regarded as absque injuria."
12OSee supra, footnote 34 and text.
121 In only one jurisdiction do the courts seem to take the position that
a possessor is unqualifiedly privileged to discharge surface water upon adjoining land in a volume and by artificial means. In Greeley v. Maine Central R. R., (1865) 53 Me. 200, defendant's railway embankment obstructed

INTERFERENCES WITH SURFACE WATERS

a qualifying rule which is, in substance, that a possessor of land is
not privileged to discharge upon adjoining land, by artificial means,
large quantities of surface water in a concentrated flow otherwise
than through natural drainways,'12 2 regardless of the means by

which the surface water is collected and discharged.123 The scope
of this qualifying rule varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but
it has been adopted in bne form or another by the courts of the
2 4
Arkansas,' 2
following common enemy jurisdictions: Arizona,'
Connecticut, 2 District of Columbia,' 2 7 Indiana,' 2 Massachu-

the flow of surface water. To dispose of the surface water so obstructed,
defendant dug a ditch which carried the water alongside the embankment
to a point where the water was discharged through a pass made in the
embankment directly upon plaintiff's land. Defendant was held not liable
for the substantial harm thereby caused to plaintiff. But cf. Smith v. Preston, (1908) 104 Me. 156, 71 AtI. 653. See supra, footnote 62.
122This particular rule has been stated by various courts in different
terms. The following are samples of the language used. In Hannaher v.
St. Paul, M. & 'M. R. R., (1887) 5 Dak. 1, 14, 37 N. W. 717, it was said,
"The defendant could not, by the rule of either the civil or common law,
collct large bodies of surface water upon its own premises by artificial
means, and eject the same by unnatural streams, and in unusual quantities,
upon the land of another. . .

."

In Linwood v. Board of Education, (1922)

92 W. Va. 387, 390, 114 S. E. 800, it was said, "One cannot collect surface
water into an artificial channel and pour it upon the lands of another to his
damage." See Note, (1902) 85 Am. St. Rep. 707, 730-733. This particular
rule, however, does not go to the extent of prohibiting a possessor from
discharging surface water into natural drainways. See infra, footnotes
132 and 141.
'23Since the object of this qualifying rule is to prevent the discharge of
large quantities of surface water in a concentrated flow by artificial means,
liability is imposed in such cases irrespective of whether that result is caused
by the collection and discharge of surface water in artificial channels, by
the obstruction and diversion of surface water by embankments, or by other
means. The particular means by which the prohibited result was caused in
the cases
cited in footnotes 124-143 is indicated wherever expedient.
124 Tucson v. Dunseath, (1904) 15 Ariz. 355, 139 Pac. 177 (diversion by
embankment); Roosevelt Irr. Dist. v. Beardsley Land & Investment Co.,
(1929) 36 Ariz. 65, 282 Pac. 937 (collection and discharge by canals);
Maricopa County Municipal Water Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. Roosevelt
Irr. Dist., (1932) 39 Ariz. 357, 6 P. (2d) 898 (diversion by embankment).
For the
general rule in Arizona, see supra, footnotes 57 and 183.
125 Jackson v. Keller, (1910) 95 Ark. 242, 129 S. W. 296 (water in
depression drained by ditch) ; Morrow v. Merrick, (1923) 157 Ark. 618, 249
S. W. 369 (diversion and discharge by levee and ditch). For the general
rules 25in Arkansas see supra, footnotes 58 and 179.
' In Connecticut less in the way of concentration in the flow of surface water is required to impose liability than in any other common enemy
jurisdiction. Adams v. Walker, (1867) 34 Conn. 466, 91 Am. Dec. 742
(land graded so as to cause water to flow upon adjoining land) ; Tidewater
Oil Sales Corporation v. Shimelman, (1932) 114 Conn. 182, 158 Atl. 229,
81 A. L. R. 256 (land graded so as to cause water to flow upon adjoining
land). In other cases the more usual statement of this rule may be found.
See Goldman v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., (1910) 83 Conn. 59, 63,
75 Atl. 148.
127
Frisbie v. Cowen, (1901) 18 App. D. C. 381 (discharge by ditch).
12 8Templeton v. Voshloe, (1880) 72 Ind. 134, 37 Am. Rep. 150 (ditches
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- New Jersey,133
setts,"29 Mississippi, 3 0 Missouri, :' 31 Nebraska, 32

New Mexico, 1 34 New York,' 35 North Dakota, 136 Oklahoma,""
cut through watershed) ; Hunter v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry., (1931)
93 Ind. App. 140, 176 N. E. 710 (discaarge by ditches). In the Templeton
Case it was said on pages 136-137, ". . . the owner of the upper field may
not construct drains or excavations so as to form new channels on to the
lower field, nor can he collect the water of several channels and discharge
it on the lower field so as to increase the wash upon the same. The right
of the owner of the upper field to make drains on his own land is restricted
to such as are required by good husbandry and the proper improvement of
the surface of the ground, and as may be discharged into natural channels,
without inflicting palpable and unnecessary injury on the lower field."
129White v. Chapin, (1866) 12 Allen (Mass.) 516 (discharge by ditch);
Curtis v. Eastern R. R., (1868) 98 Mass. 428 (water seeped through walls
of channel and so flowed upon adjoining land) ; Rathke v. Gardner, (1883)
134 Mass. 14 (discharge by ditch); Manning v. Woodlawn Cemetery Corp.,
(1923) 245 Mass. 250, 139 N. E. 830 (discharge by ditch) ; Birch v. Boston
& M. R. R., (1927) 259 Mass. 528, 156 N. E. 859 (overflow from ditch
flowed0 upon adjoining land).
" lHarvey v. Illinois C. R. R., (1916) 111 Miss. 835, 72 So. 273 (discharge of surface water ponded back of railway embankment by ditches) ;
Cresson v. Louisville & N. R. R., (1933) 166 Miss. 352, 146 So. 462 (overflow from a ditch which drained surface water collected in, an excavation) ;
see Illinois Central R. R. v. Miller, (1891) 68 Miss. 760, 764, 10 So. 61. For
the general rule in Mississippi see footnotes 64 and 180.
"3'Tucker v. Hagan, (Mo. App. 1927) 300 S. W. 301 (discharge
through ditch of surface water ponded back of railway embankment);
Kiger v. Sanko, (Mo. App. 1927) 1 S. W. (2d) 218 (discharge by ditch);
Funke v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., (1931) 225 Mo. App. 347, 35 S. W.
(2d) 977 (discharge by ditch).
"'2Davis v. Londgreen, (1878) 8 Neb. 43 (ditch drained surface water
collected in a depression and discharged it upon adjoining land) ; Lincoln
Street Ry. v. Adams, (1894) 41 Nel,. 737, 60 N. W. 83 (discharge by
ditches); Warner v. Berggren, (1931) 122 Neb. 86, 239 N. W. 473 (ditch
drained surface water collected in a depression and discharged it upon
adjoining land); see Fremont, E. & M. R. R. v. Marley, (1888) 25 Neb. 138,
146-147, 40 N. W. 948, 13 Am. St. Rep. 482. However, by statute in
Nebraska a possessor is privileged to discharge the surface water on his
land by artificial means where he drains such water "into any natural
depression or draw, whereby such water may be carried into some natural
watercourse." Nebraska, Compiled Statutes, 1929, ch. 31, art. 3, sec. 301. In
the following cases it was held that, where a possessor of land drains surface
water accumulated in a natural depression on his land by means of ditches,
and discharges such water into a natural drainway, acting with reasonable
care in so doing, he is not subject to liability for the harm thereby caused
to possessors of adjoining land, Todd v. York County, (1904) 72 Neb. 207,
100 N. W. 299; Aldritt v. Fleischauer, (1905) 74 Neb. 66, 103 N. W. 1084;
Bures v. Stephens, (1932) 122 Neb. 751, 241 N: W. 542. For the general
rules in Nebraska see footnotes 67 and 181.
'13Field v. West Orange, (1882) 36 N. J. Eq. 118, aff'd, (1883) 37
N. J. Eq. 600, 45 Am. Rep. 670 (discharge apparently by gutters in streets) ;
Weisberger v. Maurer, (1930) 9 N. J. Misc. 117, 153 AUt. 626, aff'd, (1932)
109 N. J. L. 273, 160 Atl. 634 (discharge presumably by pipe or culvert) ;
see Kelly v. Dunning, (1885) 39 N. J. Eq. 482, 483, 484-485; Nathanson v.
Wagner,
(1935) 118 N. J. Eq. 390, 393, 179 Atl. 466.
"34Rix v. Town of Alamagordo, (1938) 42 N. M. 325, 77 P. (2d) 765
(overflow from ditch flowed upon adjoining land).
"'See Barkley v. Wilcox, (1881) 86 N. Y. 147-148, 40 Am. Rep. 519.
13rSee Hannaher v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. R., (1887) 5 Dak. 1, 14, 37
N. W. 717. For the general rules in North Dakota see supra, footnotes 71
and 184.

INTERFERENCES WITH SURFACE WATERS
South Carolina,'39 Virginia, 140 Washington, 4 '
43
West Virginia,"'*' and Wisconsin.
Rhode Island," 38

'37 Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Johnson, (1910) 25 Okla. 760, 107 Pac.
662, 27 L. R. A. (N.S.) 879 (discharge by ditch); see Chicago, R. I. &
P. Ry. v. Groves, (1908) 20 Okla. 101, 113-114, 93 Pac. 755, 22 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 802; Garrett v. Haworth, (1938) 183 Okla. 569, 572, 83 P. (2d) 822.
For the general rules in Oklahoma see supra, footnotes 72, 185, and 195-197.
':1Johnson v. White, (1904) 26 R. I. 207, 58 At. 658, 65 L. R. A. 250
(discharge by culvert); see Wakefield v. Newell, (1878) 12 R. I. 75, 77,
34 Am. Rep. 598.
"3-Brandenberg v. Zeigler, (1901) 62 S. C. 18, 39 S. E. 790, 55 L. R. A.
414, 89 Am. St. Rep. 887 (ditch drained surface water collected in a depression and discharged it upon adjoining land); Garmany v. Southern Ry.,
(1929) 152 S. C. 205, 149 S. E. 765 (ditch drained surface water collected
in a depression and discharged it upon adjoining land). For the general
rules in South Carolina see supra, footnotes 74 and 198-200.
14OSee Norfolk & W. R. R. v. Carter, (1895) 91 Va. 587, 593, 22 S. E.
517. For the general rules in Virginia see supra, footnotes 75 and 182.
'""Noyes v. Cosselman, (1902) 29 Wash. 635, 70 Pac. 61, 92 Am. St.
Rep. 937 (ditch drained surface water collected in a depression and discharged it upon adjoining land); Sullivan v. Johnson, (1902) 30 Wash.
72, 70 Pac. 246 (ditch drained surface water collected in a depression and
discharged it into ditches leading through adjoining land); Whiteside v.
Benton County, (1921) 114 Wash. 463, 195 Pac. 519 (discharge by ditch) ;
Ulery v. Kitsap County, (1936) 188 Wash. 519, 63 P. (2d) 352 (discharge
by ditches); Tope v. King County, (1937) 189 Wash. 462, 65 P. (2d)
1283 (discharge by ditches and culverts). However, it has been held that
a possessor of land is privileged to accelerate the flow of surface water
through natural drainways by artificial means so long as the total quantity
of surface water discharged upon the adjoining land is not thereby increased.
Trigg v. Timmerman, (1916) 90 Wash. 768, 156 Pac. 846, L. R. A.
1916F 424.
See forton v. Hines, (1920) 112 Wash. 612, 618-619, 192 Pac. 1016,
where the court made an interesting distinction between discharging accumulated surface water and fencing out encroaching waters from other land.
'4'Knight v. Brown, (1885) 25 W. Va. 808 (discharge by ditch);
Lindamood v. Board of Education, (1922) 92 W. Va. 387, 114 S. E. 800
(discharge by artificial channel) ; see Gillison v. Charleston, (1880) 16
W. Va. 282, 304, 37 Am. Rep. 763; Clay v. St. Albans, (1897) 43 W. Va.
539, 544-546, 27 S. E. 368, 64 Am. St. Rep. 883.
14in
several early Wisconsin cases the rule was developed that a
possessor of land is not privileged, by artificial means, to drain a pond or
reservoir of surface water collected upon his land and to discharge such
water upon adjoining land. Pettigrew v. Evansville, (1870) 25 Wis. 223,
3 Am. Rep. 50 (ditch discharged the water directly upon adjoining land) ;
Wendlandt v. Cavanaugh, (1893) 85 Wis. 256, 55 N. W. 408 (ditch discharged the water directly upon adjoining land); Schuster v. Albrecht,
(1898) 98 Wis. 241, 73 N. W. 990 (ditch discharged the water a short
distance from the adjoining land so that it flowed in a concentrated volume
upon that land) ; Nicolai v. Wilkins, (1899) 104 Wis. 580, 80 N. W. 939
(tile drains discharged the water in close proximity to the adjoining land).
Subsequent cases, however, have tended to limit the rule previously developed. In Johnson v. Chicago, St. P., Ml. & 0. Ry., (1891) 80 Wis. 641,
50 N. W. 771, 14 L. R. A. 495, 27 Am. St. Rep. 76, for example, a railway
company was held not liable for harm caused by alterations made in the
flow of surface water where a ditch collected surface water ponded back
of its railway embankment and carried it to a culvert through which the
water was discharged directly upon plaintiff's land, where such water was
discharged upon plaintiff's land at the point at which the water would have
flowed naturally, and where but very little more water was discharged upon
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In jurisdictions purportedly committed to the civil law rule,
one would expect from the rationale of that rule to find that a
possessor has no privilege, under any circumstances, to interfere
with the surface water on his land so as to cause it to flow upon
adjoining land in a manner or quantity substantially different from
its natural flow. 44 An exanination of the cases in these jurisdictions, however, reveals that the courts have refused to follow the
rationale of the rule to that extent. In most of these jurisdictions
the courts have recognized that a possessor must have a privilege,
under certain circumstances, to make minor alterations in the
natural flow of surface water where necessary to the normal use
and improvement of his land, even though such alterations cause
the surface water to flow upon adjoining land in a somewhat unnatural manner. 45 This is especially true where the possessor disposes of the surface water by depositing it in existing natural
drainways.14

Consequently, the courts in the following civil law

jurisdictions, with variations from state to state, have held that a
possessor has a limited privilege to discharge surface water on other
plaintiff's land than would have flowed upon it naturally. See also Clauson
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., (1900) 106 Wis. 308, 82 N. W. 146; Shaw v.
Ward, (1907) 131 Wis. 646, 111 N. W. 671, 11 Ann. Cas. 1139; Manteufel
v. Wetzel, (1907) 133 Wis. 619, 114 N. W. 91, 19 L. R. A. (N.S.) 167;
Vick v. Strebmel, (1928) 197 Wis. 366, 222 N. W. 307.
For a general discussion of the Wisconsin law on this point see (1929)
5 Wis. L. Rev. 239.
'44This would seem to follow from the rationale of the civil law rule
considered supra, footnotes 4-7 and text.
14The scope. of the possessor's privilege, in civil law states, to rid his
land of surface water or alter its natural flow upon adjoining land, by artificial means, varies somewhat from state to state-the language of the courts
not being uniform. Compare Hughes v. Anderson, (1880) 68 Ala. 280, 286,
44 Am. Rep. 147; Dayton v. Drainage Commissioners, (1889) 128 Ill. 271,
276-277, 21 N. E. 198; Board of Trustees of Town of Auburn v. Chyle,
(1934) 256 Ky. 283, 286, 75 S. W. (2d) 1039. See also the cases cited in
footnote 109, supra.
Of course, the privilege recognized in the civil law states is not so
broad as to permit a possessor to do what he is not privileged to do in
most common enemy jurisdictions, namely, discharge surface water, by
artificial means, upon adjoining land in large quantities and in a concentrated flow outside of natural drainways.
'46Many of the cases from civi law jurisdictions dealing with the
possessor's privilege to cause, by artificial means, the surface water upon
his land to flow in a non-natural manner or quantity upon adjoining land
are cases in which the possessor either discharged the surface water into
natural drainways or improved the natural drainways so as to facilitate the
flow of surface water through them. It is in these situations that the scope
of the possessor's privilege appears to be broadest. For a general discussion,
see 3 Farnham, Law of Waters and Water Rights (1904) sec. 893,
pp. 2620-2623.
The scope of the privilege in particular jurisdictions and the situations
in which the privilege was validly exercised in individual cases are indicated
in footnotes 147-159 wherever it is helpful to do so.
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lands, by artificial means in a non-natural manner: Alabama, 14 7
Colorado, 1"41 Illinois,'"'
Iowa, 151 Kansas," 2 KenCalifornia,1"
147Dicta in Hughes v. Anderson, (1880) 68 Ala. 280, 286, 44 Am. Rep.
147, quoted in footnote 145, first defined the nature and scope of the possessor's privilege to discharge surface water upon adjoining land in a nonnatural manner and by artificial means. Since that case was decided, the
problem has been frequently reconsidered, but no substantial changes in the
principles there laid down appear to have been made. See Nininger v. Norwood, (1882) 72 Ala. 277, 282, 47 Am. Rep. 412; Walshe v. Dwight Mfg.
Co., (1912) 178 Ala. 310, 318-320, 59 So. 630; King Land & Improvement
Co., (1913) 7 Ala. App. 462, 474-478, 61 So. 22. Of course, the privilege is
quite limited. In Crabtree v. Baker, (1883) 75 Ala. 91, 51 Am. Rep. 424;
Walshe v. Dwight Mfg. Co., (1912) 178 Ala. 310, 59 So. 630; and City of
Mobile v. Lartigue, (1930) 23 Ala. App. 479, 127 So. 257, it was held that
a possessor of land is not privileged to collect surface water in artificial
channels and thereby discharge it upon adjoining land. See also Perry v.
McCraw, (1933) 226 Ala. 400, 147 So. 178, where it was held that a possessor of land is not privileged to cut through a watershed by means of a
ditch and thus discharge upon other land surface water which would not
have naturally flowed there.
lAsThe California courts have been quite hesitant in granting any extensive privilege. In Heier v. Krull, (1911) 160 Cal. 441, 444, 117 Pac. 530, it
was said, "Every landowner must bear the burden of receiving upon his
land the surface water naturally falling upon land above it and naturally
flowing to it therefrom, and he has the corresponding right to have the surface water naturally falling upon his land or naturally coming upon it, flow
freely therefrom upon the lower land adjoining, as it would flow under
natural conditions. From these rights and burdens, the principle follows
that he has a lawful right to complain of others, who, by interfering with
natural conditions, cause such surface water to be discharged in greater
quantity or in a different manner upon his land, than would occur under
natural conditions." For similar statements, see Galbreath v. Hopkins,
(1911) 159 Cal. 297, 113 Pac. 174; Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior University v. Rodley, (1918) 38 Cal. App. 563, 177 Pac. 175; Robinson v. San Diego County, (1931) 115 Cal. App. 153, 300 Pac. 971.
Although some of the cases just cited may fall within the scope of the
qualifying rule which has been adopted in most common enemy rule jurisdictions, see supra, footnotes 121-143, California seems to have been unusually strict in denying to a possessor the privilege of ridding his land of
surface water by causing it to flow upon adjoining land by artificial means.
Such a privilege has been granted to a possessor of land in only a few situations-namely, where he plows his land in furrows which have the effect of
diverting the natural flow of surface water and of causing it to flow upon
other land where it otherwise would not have flowed, Coombs v. Reynolds,
(1919) 43 Cal. App. 656, 185 Pac. 877, and where he fills in natural depressions on his land so as to cause the surface water which would have
naturally collected in them to flow upon adjoining land. Switzer v. Yunt,
(1935) 5 Cal. App. (2d) 71, 41 P. (2d) 974.
149See Boulder v. Boulder & White Rock Ditch & Reservoir Co., (1923)
73 Colo. 426, 430-431, 216 Pac. 553, 36 A. L. R. 1458, where it was said that
a possessor of land is privileged, by artificial means, to deposit in natural
drainways surface water which would have ultimately flowed into them
without the aid of artificial channels. But the privilege does not extend so
far as to permit a possessor of land "to collect in an artificial channel, or
reservoir, or pond, surface water and discharge it upon his neighbor's lands
to his injury, in a different manner from that in which it would naturally
flow if not interfered with.

. . ."

See also Canon City & Cripple Creek

R. R. v. Oxtoby, (1909) 45 Colo. 214, 218, 100 Pac. 1127.
150The Illinois law on this point has been well stated in Dayton v.
Drainage Commissioners, (1889) 128 Ill. 271, 276-277, 21 N. E. 198, quoted
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tucky, 1"' Louisiana, 1 4 Michigan,' -5 North Carolina, 50
Pennsylvania, 58 South Dakota,'5 9 and Texas. 60

Ohio,
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in footnote 145. Thus, in Peck v. Herrington, (1894) 109 Ill. 611, 50 Am.
Rep. 627, and Lambert v. Alcorn, (1893) 144 Ill. 313, 33 N. E. 53, 21
L. R. A. 611, it was held that a possessor of land is privileged to drain
surface water collected in depressions upon his land and, by means of
ditches, to deposit such water into natural drainways even though the
quantity of surface water flowing through them upon adjoining land is
thereby increased. But the privilege does not extend so far as to permit
a possessor of land, by means of ditches, to -drain surface water collected in
natural depressions upon his land and to discharge such water upon adjoining land otherwise than through natural drainways. Anderson v. Henderson, (1888) 124 I11. 164, 16 N. E. 232; Graham v. Keene, (1892) 143 Ill.
425, 532 N. E. 180.
2 ln Miller v. Hester, (1914) 167 Iowa 180, 184-185, 149 N. W. 93, it
was said, "The general rule is that the owner of the dominant estate may
not, by artificial means, concentrate at one point surface water diffused over
the surface of his land, and discharge it in a mass upon the lower land;
but this rule does not apply to natural depressions or drainways through
which the surface water on the higher land drains onto the lower land.
The great weight of authority seems to be that the flow of surface water
along such depressions or drains may be hastened and increased by artificial
means, so long as it is not diverted from the natural course of drainage."
Thus, a possessor of land in Iowa is privileged to deposit in natural drainways, by artificial means, the surface water upon his land which would
have flowed naturally in that direction without artificial alterations. Lessenger v. Harlan, (1918) 184 Iowa 172, 168 N. W. 803, 5 A. L. R. 1523;
Schwartz v. Wapello County, (1929) 208 Iowa 1229, 227 N. W. 91; Herman v. Drew, (1933) 216 Iowa 315, 249 N. W. 277; Johannsen v. Otto,
(Iowa 1938) 282 N. W. 334. Cf. Iowa, Code 1935, ch. 359, see 7736, which
provides that a possessor of land is privileged by artificial means to drain
his land into natural drainways leading to natural watercourses. The privilege, however, does not permit a possessor of land to discharge upon adjoining land through natural drainways, by artificial means, "unusually large
quantities" of surface water which have been taken out of the natural
course of drainage and deposited in the drainways. Anton v. Stanke, (1933)
217 Iowa 166, 251 N. W. 153. Nor i, a possessor of land privileged, by
means of ditches, to collect surface water and discharge it in a concentrated
flow upon adjoining land otherwise than through natural drainways. Livingston v. McDonald, (1866) 21 Iowa 160, 89 Am. Dec. 563 (the drain
carried surface water collected in a slough and discharged it upon adjoining
land) ; Baker v. Akron, (1909) 145 Iowa 485, 122 N. W. 926, 30 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 619 (watershed cut through and water collected in gutters which
discharged the surface water upon adjoining land.)
'52Kansas, General Statutes 1935, ch. 24, sec. 106, p. 714, provides:
"Owners of land may drain the same in the general course of natural drainage, by constructing open or covered drains, into any natural depression,
draw, or ravine, on his own land, whereby the water will be carried by said
depression, draw or ravine into some natural watercourse, or into any drain
upon a public highway, for the purpose of securing proper drainage to such
land. . .

."

But a possessor of land is not privileged, by means of ditches,

to discharge upon adjoining land otherwise than through natural drainways
the surface water upon his land. Dyer v. Stahlhut, (1938) 147 Kan. 767, 78
P. (2d) 900; cf. Puhr v. Kansas City, (1935) 142 Kan. 704, 707, 51 P.
(2d) 911.
"3See Board of Trustees of Town of Auburn v. Chyle, (1934) 256
Ky. 283, 286, 75 S. W. (2d) 1039, quoted in footnote 145. A possessor of
land is not privileged, however, "to collect surface water into a volume and
empty it upon the lower proprietor" See Franz v. Jacobs, (1919) 183 Ky.
647, 649, 210 S. W. 163. Nor is a possessor privileged so to grade his land
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Thus, through qualifications and modifications of both the
civil law and common enemy rules, which in rationale are so diaas to discharge upon adjoining land surface water which naturally would
not have flowed upon it. Valter v. Wagner, (1928) 225 Ky. 255, 8 S. W.
(2d) 421; Frank v. Dierson, (1930) 235 Ky. 229, 30 S. W. (2d) 950.
l5At a very early time the Louisiana Court discussed the privilege of
a possessor to cause surface water upon his land to flow upon adjoining land
by artificial means. In Martin v. Jett, (1838) 12 La. 501, 505-506, 32 Am.
Dec. 120, the court said, "We are by no means disposed to give to the code
such an interpretation as would, in effect, condemn to sterility the superior
estate. That every man has a right to clear and cultivate his land, cannot
be doubted. The clearing of land, and fitting it for agricultural purposes, is
not calculated to render this kind of servitude more onerous. . . . But it is
one thing to clear and cultivate arable lands, and another thing to reclaim
lands naturally covered with stagnant waters, in such a way as to throw
the mass of water, which would naturally remain in pools or ponds, upon
the lands of one's neighbor ... ." In that case it was held that a possessor
of land had no privilege, by means of ditches, to collect surface water and
discharge it upon adjoining land. Subsequent cases reconsidered the problem, but the conflicting statements and decisions in these cases resulted in
confusion, and the exact scope of a possessor's privilege in this regard remained uncertain for some time. See, for examples, Lattimore v. Davis,
(1839) 14 La. 161, 164, 33 Am. Dec. 581 (held liable for collecting water
in ditches which did not follow natural drainways and discharging it upon
adjoining land) ; Delahoussaye v. Judice, (1858) 13 La. Ann. 587, 587-588,
71 Am. Dec. 521 (held liable for draining ponds into a coulee so as to flood
plaintiff's land) ; Sowers & Jamison v. Shiff, (1860) 15 La. Ann. 300, 301
(held privileged to drain into natural drainways by means of ditches the
surface water which ultimately would have flowed into the drainways without the aid of the ditches) ; Hooper v. Wilkinson, (1860) 15 La. Ann. 497,
497, 77 Am. Dec. 194 (held liable for discharging surface water into a
bayou by means of ditches). It was not until 1882 in the case of Ludeling v.
Stubbs, (1882) 34 La. Ann. 935, 937-938, that the scope of the possessor's
privilege was tolerably well defined: "The owner of the superior estate may
make all drainage works which are necessary to the proper cultivation and
to the agricultural development of his estate. To that end, he may cut
ditches and canals by which the waters ruming on his estate may be concentrated, and their flow increased beyond the slow process by which they
would idtimatclv reach the SAME destination. But the owner of the
superior estate cannot improve his lands to the injury of his neighbor, and
thus he will not be allowed to cut ditches or canals, or do other drainage
works by which the waters running on his lands will be diverted from their
natural flow, and concentrated so as to flow on the lower lands of the
adjacent estate at a point which would not be their natural destination,
thus increasing the volume of water which would by natural flow run over
or reach any portion of the lower adjacent estate, or to drain over his
neighbor's lands stagnant waters from his, and to thus render the servitude
due by the estate below more burdensome." These views were approved and
applied in the relatively recent case of Bolinger v. Murray, (1931) 18 La.
App. 158, 137 So. 761, where it was held that a possessor of land was privileged to drain into natural drainways by artificial means the surface water
upon 55his land.
' In Michigan, a possessor's privilege to rid his land of surface water
by artificial means seems to have been restricted rather narrowly. It has
been held to exist only where a possessor fills in natural depressions on
his land, thereby causing the surface water which naturally would have
collected in them to flow upon adjoining land. Launstein v. Launstein,
(1907) 150 Mich. 524, 114 N. W. 383, 121 Am. St. Rep. 635; see Gregory v.
Bush, (1887) 64 Mich. 37, 42, 31 N. W. 90, 8 Am. St. Rep. 797. There is
no privilege to collect surface water in artificial channels which naturally
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metrically opposed, the courts of both groups of jurisdictions have
achieved very similar, if not substantially identical, results in cases
flows in a diffused state and, by means of the artificial channels, to cause
it to flow upon adjoining land in a concentrated volume. Yerex v. Eineder,
(1891) 86 Mich. 24, 48 N. W. 875. 24 Am. St. Rep. 113. And a possessor
is not privileged, by means of artificial channels, to drain surface water
collected in natural depressions on his land and to discharge it upon adjoining land, Miller v. Zahn, (1933) 264 M0ich. 306, 249 N. W. 862, even where
it is deposited in natural drainways. Gregory v. Bush, (1887) 64 Mich. 37,
31 N. W. 90, 8 Am. St. Rep. 797.
156The North Carolina cases dealing with this problem are not very
satisfactory. In most of the cases the statements of facts are not adequate,
and the language employed by the court is not sufficiently clear. The statement frequently is found, as in Hocutt v. Wilmington & W. R. R., (1899)
124 N. C. 214, 32 S. E. 681, that "neither a corporation nor an individual
can divert water from its natural course so as to damage another. They
may increase and accelerate, but not divert?' Although the exact meaning
of this statement is not very clear, it would seem that a possessor is privileged to accelerate and increase the flow of surface water from his land in
its natural course of drainage. Thus, in Briscoe v. Parker, (1907) 145
N. C. 14, 17, 58 S. E. 443, it was said, "The principle settled by our decisions is, that in the interest of health and good husbandry better drainage
is to be encouraged. Hence, an upper proprietor can accelerate and even
increase the flow of water from his land, but due regard for the rights of
the lower proprietor forbids that the flow of water should be diverted to
his detriment?' See Staton v. Norfolk & N. C. R. R., (1891) 109 N. C.
337, 340, 13 S. E. 933; Greenwood v. Southern Ry., (1907) 144 N. C. 446,
448, 57 S. E. 157, 119 Am. St. Rep. 967. But it is well established that the
scope of this privilege is not so broad as to permit a possessor of land to
divert surface water from its natural course of drainage by artificial means
and to cause it to flow upon other land. Thus, in Cardwell v. Norfolk &
W. Ry., (1916) 171 N. C. 365, 88 S. E. 495, where defendant placed three
culverts through its railway embankment and the surface water which collected on the upper side of the embankment was discharged through the
culverts upon plaintiff's land, defendant was held liable to plaintiff for the
harm thus caused. The culverts were not placed in natural drainways. See
also Lassiter v. Norfolk & C. R. R., (1900) 126 N. C. 509, 36 S. E. 48
(liable for causing surface water which naturally collected in a natural
depression to flow upon plaintiff's land) ; Barcliff v. Norfolk & S. R. R.,
(1915) 168 N. C. 268, 84 S. E. 290 (liable for draining a basin of boggy
land by means of ditches so as to cause the water thus drained to flood
plaintiff's land) ; Winchester v. Byers, (1928) 196 N. C. 383, 145 S. E. 774
(liable for diverting the natural flow of surface water by defendant placing
dirt in such quantities on his land that the water flooded plaintiff's land) ;
see Staton v. Norfolk & C. R. B., (1891) 109 N. C. 337, 341, 13 S. E. 933;
Brown
165 N. C. 392, 396, 81 S. E. 450.
5 v. Southern Ry., (1914)
2 71n Mason v. Fulton, (1909) 80 Ohio St. 151, 159-160, 88 N. E. 401,
24 L. B. A. (N.S.) 903, a possessor's privilege to rid his land of the surface
water upon it by causing it by artificial means to flow upon adjoining land
was defined in the following terms: "It is well settled under the rule of both
the common and civil law that surface water cannot be collected into a ditch
and discharged upon the land of another, to his damage; but the landowner
may, in the reasonable use of his land drain the water from it into its natural
outlet, whether that be a watercourse or a natural drainage channel, and thus
increase the volume and accelerate the f ow of water of such watercourse or
channel, without incurring liability for damages to owners of lower lands."
This quotation seems to be a substantially correct statement of the Ohio
law governing this problem. Thus, a posessor, by cultivating his land in the
interest of ordinary good husbandry, is privileged to alter somewhat the
natural flow of surface water and to concentrate its flow upon adjoining land.
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involving the various situations falling within this general category.
3. OBSTRUCTION OF THE NATURAL FLOW OF SURFACE WATER.
The situations here dealt with are those in which a possessor of
lower land obstructs the natural flow of surface water from adjoinSee Sheldon v. Cole, (1895) 2 Ohio N. P. 301, 313; Dill v. Oglesbee, (1898)
5 Ohio N. P. 271. The possessor's privilege, however, does not extend so
far as to permit him to collect in one artificial channel and thereby discharge upon other land surface water which naturally flowed through
several channels, Evers v. Akron, (1912) 23 Ohio C. C. (N.S.) 168, or
to drain, by means of ditches, the surface water which collected upon his
land in natural depressions and discharge it upon adjoining land. Butler v.
Peck, (1865) 16 Ohio St. 334, 88 Am. Dec. 452; Dill v. Oglesbee, (1898)
5 Ohio N. P. 271.
1
'8In Rhoads v. Davidheiser, (1890) 133 Pa. St. 226, 233, 19 Atf.
400, 19 Am. St. Rep. 630, it was said, "The owner of the upper field may
improve and drain it for agricultural purposes or the like, and in so doing
may increase the flow of water in the natural channel for it; but if he
diverts it from this channel, and creates a new channel, by which it is
discharged upon the lower field at another place, he must answer for the
damages caused by the diversion." Thus, it has been held that a possessor
of land is privileged, by means of mole drains, to rid his land of the
surface water upon it where he discharges the water upon adjoining land
at me point at which the surface water naturally would have flowed upon
the adjoining land. Meixel v. Morgan, (1892) 149 Pa. St. 415, 24 At.
216, 34 Am. St. Rep. 614. Similarly, a possessor is privileged to clear his
land of brush and trees although the result is to cause the surface water
on it to flow upon adjoining land in greater quantities and with increased
acceleration. See Strauss v. Allentown, (1906) 215 Pa. St. 96, 98, 63
At. 1073; cf. Tess v. Charleroi Home Bldg. Co., (1929) 96 Pa. Super
Ct. 505. On the other hand, a possessor of land is not privileged to collect
in artificial channels and to discharge in a concentrated flow upon other
land the surface water existing on his land which naturally would not
have flowed upon such adjoining land. Kauffman v. Griesemer, (1856)
26 Pa. St. 407, 67 Am. Dec. 437; Miller v. Laubach, (1854) 47 Pa. St.
154, 86 Am. Dec. 521; Rhoads v. Davidheiser, (1890) 133 Pa. St. 226,
19 AtI. 400, 19 Am. St. Rep. 630.
In at least two cases, however, it was indicated that the scope of the
possessor's privilege to rid his land of surface water by discharging it
upon other land is determined and measured by principles of reasonable
use. See Pfeiffer v. Brown, (1895) 165 Pa. St. 267, 30 Att. 844, 44 Am
St. Rep. 660; Markle v. Grothe, (1931)
102 Pa. Super. Ct. 90, 15S
AtI. 585.
159Thompson v. Andrews, (1917) 39 S. D. 477, 165 N. V. 9. See
also 2 South Dakota, Compiled Laws 1929, ch. 5, sec. 8479, p. 2698, which
provides that an owner of land is privileged to drain his land in the
general course of natural drainage by means of artificial drains which
deposit the surface water into natural drainways leading to natural watercourses. Thus, in "Mishler v. Peterson, (1918) 40 S. D. 183, 166 N. W.
640, it was held that a possessor of land, by means of artificial drains, is
privileged to drain the surface water collecting in natural depressions on
his land and to deposit such water into a natural drainway through which
the surface water in the locality, including the overflow from the natural
depressions, naturally flowed. But the possessor's privilege does not extend
so far as to permit him to dispose of the surface water collected in a
slough on his land by means of an artificial drain which cuts through a
natural watershed and discharges such water upon other land where it
naturally would have flowed. Boll v. Ostroot, (1910) 25 S. D. 513, 127
N. W. 577.
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ing higher land with resultant damage to that land. Such obstructions may be caused in a number of ways. The natural flow of
surface water from higher land to lower land may be through
natural drainways, or it may be in a diffused state over a wide area.
The obstruction of the natural flcw may result from the erection
of walls, dams, embankments, or buildings, or from the grading
and filling in of the lower land.
In jurisdictions committed to the civil law rule, the courts,
following the rationale of that rule,' - ' have uniformly taken the
position that a possessor of lower land is not privileged to obstruct
the natural flow of surface water from adjoining higher land to
and upon his lower land, not only where the natural flow of the
surface water is through natural drainways, 162 but also where it
flows in a diffused state over a wide area. 3
The courts following the common enemy rule, on the other
hand, are not in complete accord. In the situation where the
natural flow of the surface water is in a diffused state over a
wide area, these courts are agreed that the possessor of the lower
land is privileged to obstruct it.164 But where the natural flow is
' 60 In Texas a possessor's privilege, by artificial means, to drain his
land into natural drainways for the :ow of surface water seems to be
relatively broad. In Johnson v. McMahon, (1929) 118 Tex. 633, 15
S. W. (2d) 1023, it was held that a possessor of land is privileged, by
artificial means, to dispose of the surf[ace water collecting upon his land
in a large natural depression by discharging it into a natural drainway
where the tendency of the surface water is to flow naturally in the direction of the drainway and where the possessor acts reasonably in so doing.
And see Jefferson County Drainage District No. 6 v. McFaddin, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1927) 291 S. W. 322, 327. But a possessor of land is not
privileged to collect surface water which naturally flowed upon adjoining land in a diffused state over a wide area and to discharge such water
upon the adjoining land in a concentrated flow at a single point. Bunch
v. Thomas, (1932) 121 Tex. 225, 49 S. W. (2d) 421; Miller v. Letzerich,
(1932)61 121 Tex. 248, 49 S. W. (2d) 404, 85 A. L. R. 451.
' See footnotes 4-9 and text, supra.
62
-Ogburn v. Connor, (1873) 46 Cal. 346, 13 Am. Rep. 213; Heinse
v. Thorborg, (1930) 210 Iowa 435, 23') N. W. 881; Bolinger v. Murray,
(1931) 18 La. App. 158, 137 So. 761; Boyd v. Conklin, (1884) 54 Mich.
583, 20 N. W. 595, 52 Am. Rep. 831; McKiernann v. Grimm, (1928) 31
Ohio 63App. 213, 165 N. E. 310.
1 Johnson v. Marcum, (1913) 152 Ky. 629, 153 S. XV. 959. In 3
Farnham, Law of Waters and Water Rights (1904) sec. 889a, pp. 25862587, it is said that, under the original civil law, a possessor of lower
land was privileged to obstruct the natural flow of surface water from
adjoining higher land where it flowed naturally in a diffused state over a
wide area but that, under the Code Napoleon and the Louisiana Civil Code,
from which the American courts have derived their conception of the civil
law rule, a possessor of lower land is not privileged to obstruct the
natural
flow of surface water in this sitiation.
' 6 4Cairo & V. R. R. v. Stephens, (1881) 73 Ind. 278, 38 Am. Rep.
139; Muhleisen v. Krueger, (1930) 120 Neb. 380, 232 N. W. 735. In 3
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through natural drainways, there is a division of authority. M1any
of these courts, principally those of Maine, 16' Massachusetts, 6
Montana, 67 New M11exico, 65 South Carolina, 169 and Wisconsin, 7 0°
have taken the position that a possessor of lower land is privileged
to obstruct the surface water even though it flows through natural
drainways. The courts of Arizona,171 Nebraska, 172 North Dakota,

73

Oklahoma,1'7 4 Virginia, 17

and West Virginia,'

6

however,

Farnham, Law of Waters and Water Rights (1904) sec. 890, p. 2615, it

is said that the universal rule is that a possessor of lower land is privileged
to obstruct the natural flow of surface water from adjoining higher land
where it is in a diffused state over a wide area. The cases cited in support of
that proposition are cases from common enemy rule jurisdictions.
16 Bangor v. Lansil, (1863) 51 Me. 521.
v. Smith, (1868) 100 Mass. 181.
'cBates
7
13Le Munyon v. Gallatin Valley Ry., (1921) 60 Mont. 517, 199 Pac.
915. 5
' sWalker v. New Mexico & S. P. R. R., (1897) 165 U. S. 593, 17
Sup. Ct. 421, 41 L. Ed. 837. On this case in a dictum, however, the
court indicated that, if the natural drainways were sufficiently large and
well defined, a possessor of lower land would not be privileged to obstruct
the flow
of surface water through them. See footnote 177.
3
11
5Baltzeger v. Carolina Midland Ry., (1899) 54 S. C. 242, 32 S. E.
358, 71 Am. St. Rep. 789. For the general rules in South Carolina see
footnotes
74, 139, and 198-200.
17 "Hoyt v. Hudson, (1871) 27 Wis. 656, 9 Am. Rep. 473. But the
court in this case, in a dictum, indicated that a lower possessor would not
be privileged to obstruct the flow of surface water through sufficiently
large and well-defined natural drainways. See footnote 177.
T
7'Kroeger v. Twin Buttes R. R., (1911) 13 Ariz. 138, 114 Pac. 553,
Ann. Cas. 1913E 1229. On rehearing the same result was achieved but
upon a different ground. (1912) 14 Ariz. 269, 127 Pac. 735, Ann. Cas.
1914A 1289. For the general rules in Arizona see footnotes 57 and 183.
'72Leaders v. Sarpy County, (1938) 134 Neb. 817, 270 N. W. 809;
see Aldritt v. Fleischauer, (1905) 74 Neb. 66, 70-71, 103 N. W. 1084. Cf.
Lincoln & B. H. R. R. v. Sutherland, (1895) 44 Neb. 526, 62 N. W. 859,
in which the liability for obstructing the natural flow of surface water
through natural drainways seems to have been predicated upon negligence.
For the general rules in Nebraska see footnotes 67 and 181.
173Soules v. Northern Pacific Ry., (1916)
34 N. D. 7, 157 N. W. 823,
L. R. A. 1917A, 501; Reichert v. Northern Pacific Ry., (1917) 39 N. D.
114, 167 N. W. 127. In these cases the lower possessor's liability for obstructing the natural drainways seems to have been predicated upon negligence. Thus, if the lower possessor is not negligent in obstructing the
drainways, liability will not be imposed. Henderson v. Hines, (1921) 48
N. D. 152, 183 N. W. 531. For the general rules in North Dakota see
71 and 184.
footnotes
'17 Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Groves, (1908) 20 Okla. 101, 93 Pac.
755, 22 L. R. A. (N.S.) 802; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Brown, (1925)
112 Okla. 1, 239 Pac. 599. Cf. Garrett v. Haworth, (1938) 183 Okla. 569,
570-571, 83 P. (2d) 822, where the definition of watercourse was extended
to include natural drainways for the flow of surface water. For the
general rules in Oklahoma see footnotes 72, 185, and 195-197.
175Norfolk & W. R. R. v. Carter, (1895) 91 Va. 587, 22 S. E. 517.
For the general rules in Virginia see footnotes 75 and 182.
47 W. Va. 316, 34 S. E. 914,
713'In Neal v. Ohio River R. R., (1899)
the definition of watercourse was extended so as to include natural drainways for the flow of surface water. Consequently, a possessor of lower
land is not privileged to obstruct natural drainways.
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have adopted the contrary view that a lower possessor is not privileged to obstruct natural drainways. A compromise view to the
effect that a lower possessor is privileged to obstruct relatively
small natural drainways, but is not privileged to obstruct the
natural flow of large quantities of surface water through relatively
large and well defined natural drainways is followed in New
Jersey..

7

Thus, although the two rules produce opposite results in the
cases involving the obstruction of diffused surface waters, the
modifications of the strict common enemy rule in a number of
jurisdictions, where the case involves obstruction of natural drainways, produces decisions in accord with those in the civil law states.
4.

THE QUALIFIED COMMBrON ENEmY RULE.

In a number of

jurisdictions purportedly committed to the common enemy rule,
the courts have substantially modified the entire rule by developing
and, in a sense, substituting a principle of liability which makes a
near approach to the reasonable use doctrine. Although the courts
of these jurisdictions have stated the principle in somewhat different terms, 178 it would seem to be, in substance, that where a
177In Earl v. De Hart, (1856) 12 N. J. Eq. 280, 72 Am. Dec. 395, it
was held that a possessor of land is not privileged, by means of a dam, to
obstruct the natural flow of surface water through well-defined natural
drainways. This result was achieved by extending the definition of watercourse. It was said on pages 283-284, "If the face of the country is such
as necessarily collects in one body so large a quantity of water, after
heavy rains and the melting of large bodies of snow, as to require an
outlet to some common reservoir, and if such water is regularly discharged through a well-defined chamel, which the force of the water
has made for itself, and which is the accustomed channel through which
it flows, and has flowed from time immemorial, such channel is an ancient
natural water-course." But in the later case of Bowlsby v. Speer, (1865)
31 N. J. L. 351, 86 Am. Dec. 216, the Earl Case was distinguished on
a seemingly immaterial basis, and it was held that a possessor of lower
land was privileged, by means of the erection of a stable, to obstruct
the natural flow of surface water through a small ravine. On page 353,
the court said, ". . . no right of any kind can be claimed in the mere
flow of surface water, and . . . neither its retention, repulsion, or altered
transmission is an actionable injury, even though damage ensues. How
far it may be necessary to modify this general proposition in cases in
which, in a hilly region, from the natural formation of the surface of the
ground, large quantities of water, in times of excessive rains or from
the melting of heavy snows, are forced to seek a channel through gorges
or narrow valleys, will probably require consideration when the facts of
the case shall present the question. It would seem that such anomalous
cases might reasonably be regarded as forming exceptions to the general
rule. Subsequently, in Kelly v. Dunning, (1885) 39 N. J. Eq. 482, 483484, both cases were cited with apparent approval, thus indicating that
the Earl Case fell within the possible exception to the general rule noted
in the Bowlsby Case. An examination of the facts of the cases seems to
indicate that that conclusion is well founded.
17sIn Holman v. Richardson, (1917) 115 Miss. 169, 179, 76 So. 136,
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possessor of land uses reasonable care to avoid causing unnecessary
harm to others, he is privileged to use and improve his land for
proper purposes although the natural flow of surface water is
thereby altered. The courts of Arkansas, 179 Mississippi, 180 NeL. R. A. 1917F, 942, it was said, ". . . the rule with us . . . is that
when adjoining lots owned by different persons are on a different level,
so that there will be a natural flow of rainwater in a diffused state from
the higher to the lower level, the owner of the lower lot may fend the
water therefrom, provided he does so for proper objects and exercises
reasonable care to prevent unnecessary injury to the higher lot. . . . This
rule . . . is simply a concrete application of the maxim that, 'One must
so use his own as to not unnecessarily injure others." See also Norfolk
W. R. R. v. Carter, (1895) 91 Va. 587, 592-593, 22 S. E. 517.
17 0
In Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. v. Chapman, (1882) 39 Ark. 463,
43 Am. Rep. 280, defendant constructed its railway embankment so as to
obstruct the natural flow of surface water from plaintiff's land. The two
small tile drain pipes which defendant placed through its embankment were
not sufficient to dispose of the surface water, and as a result plaintiff's
land was flooded. A culvert could have been placed through the embankment at a reasonable expense which would have adequately disposed of
the surface water. Defendant was held liable, the court saying on page
481, "It was not necessar3y to the enjoyment of that (the right of way),
that the bed should be solid throughout. The damage was of course unnecessary. . . . It was not reasonable that it [the defendant] should render
so much property useless, when it might so easily have prevented it without detriment to its operations."
See also Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. v.
Wallis, (1907) 82 Ark. 447, 102 S. W. 390; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v.
Hardie, (1908) 87 Ark. 475, 113 S. W. 31; Burel v. Hutson, (1924) 165
Ark. 111, 263 S. W. 57. However, the possessor is not absolutely prohibited from altering the natural flow of surface water in such a way as
to cause harm to others. He merely has to exercise reasonable care.
Baker v. Allen, (1899) 66 Ark. 271, 50 S. W. 511, 74 Am. St. Rep. 93;
Leader v. Matthews, (1936) 192 Ark. 1049, 95 S. W. (2d) 1138. See
supra, footnote 58.
1 0
8 In Sinai v. Louisville, N. 0. & T. Ry., (1893) 71 Miss. 547, 14 So.
87, defendant constructed a solid railway embankment which obstructed
the natural flow of surface water from plaintiff's land and flooded it.
The court reversed an order sustaining defendant's demurrer to the complaint, saying on page 554, "The rule possessing flexibility and adaptability
to all conditions likely to arise, is that which guards the right of the
landowner to deal with his own as he will, qualified by the duty imposed
upon him to so use his own as not to hurt his neighbor, if that be reasonably within his power. In the case at bar, to reach a right conclusion, we
must consider the character and value of construction or embankment;
the likely to be foreseen interference with the usual flow of the waters
; the extent and amount of the injury done to adjacent landowners compared with the cost and value of the embankment, and whether
any other type of construction, equally safe, convenient and inexpensive
might have been adopted." See also Holman v. Richardson, (1917) 115
Miss. 169, 76 So. 136, L. R. A. 1917F 942. Of course, a possessor is
not absolutely prohibited from making harmful alterations in the natural
flow of surface water. Columbus & G. Ry. v. Taylor, (1928) 149 Miss. 269,
115 So. 200. Compare Kansas City, M. & B. R. R. v. Smith, (1895) 72
Miss. 677, 17 So. 78, 27 L. R. A. 762, 48 Am. St. Rep. 579, which
deals with the flood water of watercourses. See supra, footnote 64.
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braska,' s ' Virginia,'8 2 and perhaps Arizona,8 2 North Dakota,
85
and Oklahoma' have developed such a principle.
81
In Lincoln & B. H. R. R. v. Sutherland, (1895) 44 Neb. 526,
62 N. W. 859, defendant railway constructed a solid railway embankment across a natural drainway, with the result that the flow of surface
water was obstructed so as to flood plaintiff's land. The court found
that defendant was negligent in failing to provide an outlet for the water,
and so held it liable for the harm caused to plaintiff. In Todd v. York
County, (1904) 72 Neb. 207, 100 N. 17T. 299, a possessor cleaned out and
deepened an existing ditch which drained surface water on his land into
a natural drainway. He was held not liable because he acted with reasonable care and followed "the practical, most natural, and reasonable plan
that could be adopted." A similar situation was involved and the same result reached in Aldritt v. Fleischauer, (1905) 74 Neb. 66, 103 N. W. 1084.
See supra,
footnote 67.
1821n McGehee v. Tidewater Ry., (1908) 108 Va. 508, 62 S. E. 356,
defendant railway constructed a solid railway embankment which had the
effect of obstructing the natural flow of surface water from plaintiff's land
and flooding it. It was held error to charge the jury that defendant was
not subject to liability for obstructing the natural flow of surface water.
The court said on page 511, "And the qualified rule of the common law

in this State, with regard to surface water .

.

.

. imposes upon the

lower land owner, in the betterment or protection of his own property,
the duty of exercising his rights, not wantonly, unnecessarily, or carelessly, but in good faith and with such care as not to needlessly injure
the upper owner." See also Raleigh Court v. Faucett, (1924) 140 Va.
126, 124 S.E. 433. In Harris Motor Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., (1928)
151 Va. 125, 144 S. E. 414, where defendant constructed a building which
obstructed the natural flow of surface water from plaintiff's adjoining
land, and it was not shown that the defendant has "so carelessly and recklessly constructed its building as to inflict needless and unnecessary injury,
which could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care." defendant was held not liable. See also Town of Farmville v. Wells, (1920)
127 Va. 528, 103 N. E. 596, and the quotation in footnote 178 from Norfolk & W. R. R. v. Carter, (1895) 91 Va. 587, 592-593, 32 S. E. 517. See
supra, footnote 75.
3
'S
In Tucson v. Dunseath, (1914) 15 Ariz. 355, 139 Pac. 177, defendant was held liable for harm caused to plaintiff by the filling in of a
drainage ditch and the throwing up of an embankment which diverted
surface water upon plaintiff's land. The court quoted at length from
the case of Sheehan v. Flynn, (1894) 59 Minn. 436, 61 N. W. 462, 26
L. R. A. 632, discussed in footnotes 94-100, and may have predicated the
defendant's liability upon a finding of negligence. Probably, however, the
defendant's liability was based upon the rule followed in most common
enemy jurisdictions, considered in footnotes 121-143 and text. Subsequent Arizona cases have not cleared up the doubt. See Gibson v. Duncan,
(1915) 17 Ariz. 329, 152 Pac. 856; Roosevelt Irr. Dist. v. Beardsley Land
& Investment Co., (1929) 36 Ariz. 65, 282 Pac. 937. See supra, footnote 57.
1841n Henderson v. Hines, (1921) 48 N. D. 152, 159-161, 183 N. W.
531, it was said that the common enemy rule of surface waters was subject
to the qualification that a possessor is not privileged to cause harm by his
negligent acts in altering the natural flow of surface water. For a further discussion see footnote 173 and text. See also footnote 71.
' 85In Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Groves, (1908) 20 Okla. 101, 93
Pac. 755, 22 L. R. A. (N.S.) 802, where it was held that a possessor of
lower land is not privileged to obstruct the flow of surface water through
natural drainways so as to cause harm to possessors of higher land, (see
footnote 174 and text) the court said on pages 111-112, "Practically all of
the common-law courts agree that the surface water, flowing naturally or
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The similarity of the principle developed by these courts to
that expounded and applied in the relatively early Minnesota case
of Sheehan v. Flynn'8" is apparent. Consequently, it would seem
justifiable to conclude that the courts following the so-called "qualified" common enemy rule are on their way toward complete acceptance of the reasonable use principle.
5.

MISCELLANEOUS MODIFICATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS.

In

addition to the foregoing, many other modifications and qualifications of the civil law and common enemy rules are to be found in
the cases. Since many of them are not of sufficient importance to
justify discussion, only the most important will be considered.
These are, first, the so-called exception to the civil law rule with
respect to urban land and, second, the peculiar rules developed in
Oklahoma and South Carolina.
In several of the states following the civil law rule, the question of whether it is applicable to cases involving urban land has
been considered. On this question there is a split of authority.
The courts of Alabama, 87 California,8 8 and Pennsylvania8 9 have
falling upon the soil, may be diverted in its course, and even thrown back
upon the dominant estate whence it came. But is this right absolute at
the will of the lower proprietor, or must such exercise be reasonable,
for proper purposes, and with due care to inflict injury only when it is
necessary? The question of good faith and the manner of doing it are
necessarily involved in determining whether or not such right may be
exercised. When necessary, and with due care and regard as to the rights
of others, although injury may accompany its exercise, under the common law there is no relief. The doctrine that the right may not be
exercised wantonly, unnecessarily or carelessly does not rest upon the civil
law so much as upon the common law. 'Sic utere tuo ut alienum non

laedas.'"
But this statement apparently has not been followed in subsequent Oklahoma cases. Rather it appears to have been perverted into
a very peculiar and contradictory principle of liability.
See footnotes
195-197. See also footnote 72.
1"0(1894) 59 Minn. 436, 61 N. W. 462, 26 L. R. A. 632, discussed in
footnotes
94-100 and text.
137 1n Hall v. Rising, (1904) 141 Ala. 431, 37 So. 586, it was held
that a possessor of urban land is privileged to raise the level of his land,
although the natural flow of surface water is thereby diverted upon other
urban land. In Shahan v. Brown, (1913) 179 Ala. 425, 60 So. 891, 43
L. R. A. (N.S.) 792, and Ex parte Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. R. Co.,
(1921) 206 Ala. 403, 90 So. 876, it was held that a possessor of lower
urban land is privileged to obstruct the natural flow of surface water from
adjoining higher urban land by a fence or wall. However, this nonapplicability of the civil law rule with respect to urban land does not
extend to railway embankments which obstruct the natural flow of surface water from adjoining urban land. With respect to such embankments the civil law rule applies. Alabama Power Co. v. Alford, (1923)
210 Ala. 98, 97 So. 224; cf. Southern Ry. v. Lewis, (1910) 165 Ala. 555,
51 So. 746. See supra, footnote 16.
'8'In Los Angeles Cemetery Assn. v. Los Angeles, (1894) 103 Cal.
461, 467, 37 Pac. 375, it was said, "The doctrine of the civil law, in
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apparently adopted the view that although the civil law rule is
applicable to rural land, the common enemy rule in some form
applies to urban land. In Kansas the same result has been achieved
through the enactment of a statute. 190 On the other ,hand, the
courts of Georgia,"" Kentucky, 192 Tennessee,'9 3 and perhaps
Ohio, 194 have taken the opposite position, namely, that the civil
law rule applies to urban as well as to rural land.
reference to a servitude in the lower tenement in favor of the upper or
dominant tenement, for the flow of surface water, had no application to
lots held in cities and towns, where changes and alterations in the surface
were essential to the enjoyment of such lots, and this rule has been very
generally adopted in this country." However, in Jaxon v. Clapp, (1919)
45 Cal. App. 214, 187 Pac. 69, where the court expressly recognized the
general non-applicability of the civil law rule to urban land, the court
nevertheless held that a possessor of urban land is not privileged to collect
a volume of surface water and discharge it through a pipe with a high
velocity and in a concentrated flow upon adjoining urban land. This decision is in accord with the decisions of courts in most coninmon enemy
jurisdictions.
See footnotes 121-143. See also supra, footnote 17.
1 9 The early Pennsylvania case of Bentz v. Armstrong, (1844) 8
Watts & S. 40, 42, 42 Am. Dec. 265, contained a dictum to the effect
that a possessor of urban land is privileged to alter the natural flow of
surface water by using and improving his land. Since that case it has
been established that the civil law rule does not apply to urban land.
Kohn v. Moore, (1872) 4 Leg. Gaz. 46; Rielly v. Stephenson, (1908) 222
Pa. St. 252, 70 Atl. 1097, 22 L. R. A. (N.S.) 947, 128 Am. St. Rep.
804; Wilson v. McCluskey, (1911) 46 Pa. Super. Ct. 594; see Davidson v.
Sanders, (1896) 1 Pa. Super. Ct. 432, 436-437; McMahon v. Thornton,
(1897) 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 495, 502. However, a possessor of urban land is not
absolutely privileged to alter the natural flow of surface water as he
pleases regardless of the harm he thereby causes to others. His privilege
exists only where he uses reasonable care to avoid causing unnecessary
harm to others. Davidson v.-Sanders, (1896) 1 Pa. Super. Ct. 432; see
Rielly v. Stephenson, (1908) 222 Pa. St. 252, 70 AtI. 1097, 22 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 947, 128 Am. St. Rep. 804; Wilson v. McCluskey, (1911) 46 Pa.
Super. Ct. 594, 596-599. This limited privilege seems to be practically
identical with the qualified common enemy rule discussed at footnotes
179-185 and text. See also supra, footnote 30.
' 9 OKansas, Gen. Stat. 1935, ch. 24, sec. 105. In Kansas the common
enemy rule was originally adopted. And because the statute in question
in effect applies the civil law rule only to agricultural lands and to highways in rural districts, it follows that the common enemy rule is still in
force with respect to urban land. See supra, footnote 22.
v. Elsas, (1874) 53 Ga. 186. See supra, footnote 19.
19'Goldsmith
' 92 Although in the early case of Middlesborougho Town Co. v. Helwig,
(1892) 14 Ky. L. Rep. 430, it was held that the civil law rule did not
apply to urban land, that case has since been overruled, and it is now
settled that the civil law rule applies to urban land. Johnson v. Marcum,
(1913) 152 Ky. 629, 153 S. W. 959. See supra, footnote 23.
193Garland v. Aurin, (1899) 103 Tenn. 555, 53 S.W. 940, 48 L. R. A.
862, 76 Am. St.'Rep. 699. See supra, footnote 32.
194In Cincinnati, H. & D. R. R. v. Ahr, (1873) 2 Cin. Super. Ct.
Rep. 504, 13 Ohio Dec. (Repr.) 1035, it was held that the civil law rule
applied to urban land. But in the case of Brown v. Krody, (1921) 19
Ohio L. Rep. 506, it was held that a possessor of urban land is privileged
to fill his land and erect buildings upon it although the natural flow of
surface water is thereby diverted upon other land. The conflict between
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In Oklahoma and South Carolina, the courts have developed
unique rules which, in statement, appear to be quite ambiguous.
In Oklahoma it is said that the common enemy rule is in force
subject to the qualification that a possessor of land is not privileged
to alter the natural flow of surface water so as to cause "injury"
to others.'"' On its face this rule is ambiguous and silly. If by the
term "injury" the court means the invasion of a legal right, the
rule begs the question. If the court means physical damage, then
it is for all practical purposes stating the civil law rule. An examination of the cases throws little light on the meaning of "injury"
as the court uses the term. Thus, for example, where a possessor
of lower land obstructs the natural flow of surface water from
adjoining higher land so as to flood the higher land, there is no
"injury" within the meaning of the rule.1 " But where a possessor
by artificial means discharges upon adjoining land, in large quantities and in a concentrated flow, surface water which has been
collected upon his land in a volume, there is "injury" within the
meaning of the rule. 197 The conclusion would seem to be that in
spite of the language used by the court in stating its rule, the cases
decided under it are in substantial accord with those in most common enemy jurisdictions.
In South Carolina it is said that the common enemy rule is in
force, subject to the qualification that a possessor of land is not
privileged, by altering the flow of surface water, to create a "nuisance" or a "nuisance per se."' 19 The general acceptance of this
proposition seems to have been brought about through the reiteration of a dictum from a relatively early case."" Whatever its source,
these two decisions was not resolved in the later case of McKiernann v.
Grimm, (1928) 31 Ohio App. 213, 165 N. E. 310, where the court expressly refused to decide the question fully. In that case a possessor of
urban land, by grading his land and erecting a garage upon it, obstructed
the flow of surface water through a natural drainway and diverted it upon
other urban land. He was held liable for the harm thereby caused. See
supra,9 footnote 29.
' 'Garrett v. Haworth, (1938) 183 Okla. 569, 572, 83 P. (2d) 822.
See supra, footnotes 72 and 185.
10OTaylor
v. Shriver, (1921) 82 Okla. 11, 198 Pac. 329.
'9-Hatmaker v. Gripe, (Okla. 1937) 84 P. (2d) 418; see Gulf, C. & S.
F. Ry. v. Richardson, (1914) 42 Okla. 457, 460-461, 141 Pac. 1107; Garrett
v. Haworth, (1938) 183 Okla. 569, 572, 83 P. (2d) 822. This result is
achieved in most common enemy rule jurisdictions. See supra, footnotes
121-143.
' Touchberry v. Northwestern R. R., (1911) 87 S. C. 415, 423-424,
69 S. E. 877; Garmany v. Southern Ry., (1929) 152 S. C. 205, 207, 149
S. E.9 765. See supra, footnote 74.
If' "The only exception to the rule that surface water being a common enemy, every landowner has the right to deal with it in any such
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however, the proposition is relatively meaningless, and its principal effect has been to throw the South Carolina law of surface
200
waters into confusion..
With the foregoing modifications and qualifications of the civil
law and common enemy rules in mind, it should be rather apparent
that the uniform and predictable conflict of decision which would
seem inevitable from the general statements of the two rules is not
an actuality, and that in many types of situation, though by no
means in all, the actual decisions under both rules are harmonious.
Furthermore, it should be obvious that the development of the
law of surface waters under these two rules has been from generalization to particularization. Starting with absolute, unqualified
general rules, the courts soon found that their decisions under
either rule would be harsh and unjust in many cases, and following
manner as he may see fit, is that it is subject to the general law in regard
to nuisances, if its accumulation has become a nuisance per se, as for
example, whenever it has become dangerous at all times and under all circumstances to life, health or property." Baltzeger v. Carolina Ifidland Ry.,
(1899) 54 S. C. 242, 247, 32 S. E. 358, 71 Am. St. Rep. 789. This
quotation has been repeated in the following cases: Touchberry v. Northwestern R. R., (1911) 87 S. C. 415, 423-424, 69 S. E. 877; Rivenbark v.
Atlantic Coast Line Ry., (1923) 124 S. C. 136, 141, 117 S. E. 206; Deason v.
Southern Ry., (1927) 142 S. C. 328, 333, 140 S. E. 575; Fairey v. Southern
Ry., 2(1931)
162 S. C. 129, 132-133, 160 S. E. 274.
00
The decisions of the South Carolina Court reveal the extent to
which it has been confused by the rule here considered. In Rivenbark v.
Atlantic Coast Line Ry., (1923) 124 S. C. 136, 117 S. E. 206, and Fairey v.
Southern Ry., (1931) 162 S. C. 129, 160 S. E. 274, where railway companies obstructed the natural flow of surface water from adjoining higher
land and thereby ponded the surface water upon such adjoining land, the
railway companies were held not liable for the harm caused for the reason
that the facts of the cases did not bring them within the so-called nuisance
exception to the common enemy rule. But in Deason v. Southern Ry.,
(1927) 142 S. C. 328, 140 S. E. 575, where a similar situation was involved, a different result was reached. In that case defendant railway
obstructed the natural flow of surface water from plaintiff's adjoining
higher land and caused it to be ponded upon plaintiff's land. On trial the
jury was charged that defendant was liable if it backed surface water upon
plaintiff's land so as to create a nuisance and also that it was for the
jury to determine whether a nuisance has been created. The jury returned
a verdict for plaintiff and judgment was entered accordingly. On appeal
that judgment was affirmed, two justices dissenting. These cases seem
indistinguishable.
Of course, the meaning of the South Carolina rule depends upon the
interpretation given to the term "nuisance." In the Rivenbark and Fairey
Cases, supra, the court did not discuss the meaning of that term, but in
the Deason Case, supra, the court employed the standard and thoroughly
unsatisfactory dictionary definition that a "nuisance" is "anything that unlawfully worketh hurt, inconvenience or damage." Consequently, it would
seem that it is at this point that fae confusion in the South Carolina
cases has arisen. If the American Law Institute's interpretation of "private
nuisance" were accepted by the South Carolina court, there would be no
difficulty, for in that case the reasonable use doctrine would, in effect,
be adopted. See Restatement, Torts (Vol. IV) secs. 822-831.
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the characteristic tendency so obvious in many fields of our common law they proceeded to single out one specific type of case
after another for special treatment, without bothering to reconsider the validity of their general rule in the light of the constantly
growing body of "exceptions" to it. The result is a mass of particularized local rules, varying from state to state, and defying
accurate generalization or reconciliation. The only solution in
these states would seem to be a reversion to a broad general rule,
but not of the sort they started with. Instead of a general rule
prescribing absolute privileges or prohibitions they need a flexible
rule like the rule of reasonableness, which merely lays down a
general objective and a list of factors to be considered in determining whether or not that objective has been attained in any
given case.

The Minnesota cases, 20

1

of which there have been

many, present a striking picture of the complete cycle: First, the
unqualified common enemy rule; then specific exceptions; then the
"qualified" common enemy rule; and finally, the gradual adoption
of the reasonable use principle as the sole test. Several other states
have completed all but the last step in this cycle,2

2

and it seems

only a matter of time until many will have finished it. Certainly
the trend in this direction is unmistakable.

II.

GENERAL COIIENT

So far this discussion has been devoted primarily to an exposition of the existing case law on the subject of surface waters
and the remarkable confusion it has produced in the way of rules
and principles. Occasional statements of the reasons given by
the courts for their decisions have been made, and some critical
analysis was presented in the discussion of the reasonable use
rule. However, no comprehensive critique has been made, and
it is questionable whether one should be attempted. It is no
doubt obvious from the tenor of the discussion that the writers
whole-heartedly approve the reasonable use approach, and in
view of the fact that the American Law Institute has adopted it
in the recently published fourth volume of the Restatement of
Torts, 2 1 3 it might be appropriate to end on that note.

Neverthe-

less, there is one aspect of this branch of the law that has not received attention in the cases or legal writings, and it therefore
seems worth while to mention it.
"See supra, footnotes 89-103 and text.
-112See supra, footnotes 178-186 and text.
-0 Sec. 833. See generally, Sections 822-864.
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PROPERTY OR TORT

Under most of the existing classifications of the law, the rule,
relative to surface waters are treated as part of the general law
of private waters which, in turn, is usually regarded as a branch
of property law. And though "Water Law" is sometimes a separate course in law schools, it is more often dealt with in one of
the property courses along with sach things as Lateral Support,
Oil and Gas and Air Law. This classification is probably due to
the fact that most controversies over private waters arise between
adjoining landowners and nearly always involve invasions of interests in land rather than interests in personality or chattels. Whatever the reason, the consequence is that the legal relations of the
parties have been stated almost invariably in terms of property
concepts-rights, privileges, servitudes, "natural easements" and
so on. There is no question, however, that one's liability for interfering with surface waters, when incurred, is a tort liability.
An unjustified invasion of a possessor's interest in the use and
enjoyment of his land through the medium of surface waters,
or any other type of waters, is as much a tort as a trespass or a
private nuisance produced by smoke or smells. Nevertheless,
the courts and writers seldom analyze the problems in terms of
tortious conduct, causation or other tort concepts.
Analytically, of course, a determination of the scope of a possessor's rights with respect to his land is automatically a determination of the extent of the legal duties that others owe him,
and the ascertainment of his privileges as a possessor determines
the scope of others' rights agairst him. Therefore, it should
make little difference, so far as a satisfactory solution of surface
water problems is concerned, whether the courts deal with the
matter in terms of property rights or in terms of legal duties and
tort liabilities. As a matter of fact, however, the property approach has not proved very successful, and is undoubtedly responsible for a substantial amount of the existing confusion in
the law.
In the first place, the property terms have not always been
carefully defined or used. Many courts, for example, have employed the term "right" in a loose, indefinite way to describe both
claims and privileges. The following quotation from the case of
Martin v. Simpson20 4 is illustrative:
"No one has a right, by an artificial structure of any kind
204(1863) 6 Allen (Mass.) 102, at p. 104.

INTERFERENCES WITH SURFACE WATERS

upon his own land, to cause the water which falls and accumulates thereon in rain or snow to be discharged upon land of an
adjacent proprietor. Such an erection, if it occasions the water
to flow, either in the form of a stream, or only in drops, works
a violation of the adjoining proprietor's right of property, and
cannot be justified unless a right is shown by express grant or
by prescription." [Italics added].
This use of the same term to denote both the plaintiff's legal
claim and the defendant's privilege is quite common in the cases,
and little argument is needed to show that it inevitably produces
confusion.
Another and more serious difficulty is that the property terms
have hindered if not precluded a careful analysis of the surface
water problem. As indicated at the beginning of this paper, the
fundamental question in all of these cases is whether the loss or
inconvenience resulting to one person from another's interference
with surface waters should be left where it falls or shifted to the
person causing it. If we could give as an answer to this question a flat "yes" or "no" under a strict "common enemy" or "civil
law" rule, the property concepts would clearly be suitable. Witness, for example, the following statements:
"The right which the higher tenement has to require the
lower one to receive from it the surface water that naturally
drains to and upon it is a right incident to the higher tenement,
and a part of the property of the owner in it; and for any invasion of this right the law will afford him a remedy." 5
4. *. the right of a party to the free and unfettered control of his own land above, upon and beneath the surface cannot
be interfered with or restrained by any considerations of injury
to others which may be occasioned by the flow of mere surface
water in consequence of the lawful appropriation of land by its
owner to a particular use or mode of enjoyment." 20 6 [Italics added].
As we have seen, however, the strict, uncompromising civil
law and common enemy rules have given way and been modified
to a considerable extent in most jurisdictions. The courts have
recognized that the "right" or "servitude" must, in some respects, be restricted and qualified, but most of them have had
difficulty in analyzing that qualification and in expressing it.
Such words as "right," "servitude" and "easement" seem to
connote something fixed and definite to most courts, and it is
difficult for them to use those terms in describing flexible legal
21"Blue v. Wentz, (1896) 54 Ohio St. 247, at p. 255.
2'Gannon v. Hargadon, (1865) 10 Allen (Mass.) 106, 109.
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relations dependent on varying circumstances. The terms have
acquired a certain rigidity and absoluteness from their long association with the Land Law. It is hard not to think of them
as tangible things existing independently of the acts and motives
of men or the configurations of land and vicissitudes of climate.
It is true, of course, that the New Hampshire courts have succeeded in analyzing the problem and working out, in terms of
"qualified rights," their principle of flexible legal relations based on
reasonable use. Occasional cases in other jurisdictions manifest similar success. By and large, however, the property approach and terminology has proved to be a stumbling block to
clear analysis. Note, for example, the confusion of thought
in the following quotation, largely engendered by the way in
which the term "right" is used:
"This right in regard to surface water may not be exercised
wantonly, unnecessarily, or carelessly; but is modified by that
golden maxim of the law, that one must so use his own property
as not to injure the rights of another. It must be a reasonable
use of the land for its improvement or better enjoyment, and the
right must be exercised in good faith, with no purpose to abridge
or interfere with the rights of others, and with such care with
respect to the property that may be affected by the use or improvement as not to inflict any injury beyond what is necessary.
Where the exercise of the right is thus guarded, although injury
20 7
may result to the land of another, he is without remedy.1

[Italics added].
In making the aboye statement the court was apparently trying to express the idea that the legal relations of the parties depended upon the reasonableness of their activities in view of the
circumstances of the case. The haziness comes from the assumption that each party has some sort of preexisting, semi-tangible
thing called a "right" which in some unexplained way enters the
picture and must be dealt with.
It is interesting to observe the increased clarity of thought and
expression when the same court abandons the property terminology and expresses the legal relations of the parties in terms of
legal obligations:
"The law of this state . . . as to surface waters . . . imposes

upon the lower landowner the duty of so using his land as not
needlessly or negligently20' 8to injure the upper owner in the enjoyment of his property.

-07Norfolk & W. R. R. v. Carter, (1895) 91 Va. 587, 592-93, 22 S. E.
517. -2O8Raleigh Court v. Faucett, (1924) 140 Va. 126, 136, 124
S. E. 433.
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It is not suggested that the law of torts is perfect or that tort
terminology is a panacea for all ills, but it is certainly true that
an approach to the surface water problems from the standpoint
of the "prerequisites of liability" rather than the "rights of the
parties" brings out a clearer and more penetrating analysis of the
fundamental considerations involved. Treating the matter as a
question of tort liability, attention is focused on such practical
and concrete problems as "the necessity of actual damage," "the
reasonable or unreasonable character of the defendant's conduct
in view of all the circumstances," and "the relative value of the
interests involved," rather than on the limitations and qualifications of a categorical "right" or "servitude" presupposedly assumed and ill-defined.

